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A new type of environmental problem is emerging which differs in 
nature from the more familiar pollution and resource depletion problems . 
This type of problem, which may be called environmental risk, 1 has rapidly 
increased in importance over the last few decades and may indeed become 
the dominant type of environmental problem . Environmental risk problems 
are exemplified by : the risk of leakage and contamination in the disposal of 
nuclear wastes; the production of synthetic chemicals which may be toxic, 
carcinogenic, mutagenic , or teratogenic; the risk-0f ozone depletion due to 
fluorocarbon emissions by supersonic transports; and the danger presented 
by recombinant DNA of the creation and escape of a new disease against 
which mankind has no natural defense . 
Society is vulnerable to environmental risk problems for two reasons .  
First, because environmental risk i s  not yet adequately recognized a s  a 
specific type of problem, its characteristics are not well defined . A problem 
inadequately defined is difficult to control . Second, the characteristics 
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1. "Environmental risk" will be defined specifically in terms of nine characteristics 
discussed infra. "Risk" has several distinct meanings depending on its usage. In "environmen­
tal risk," the term draws attention to the potential adverse consequences, for which the 
underlying probability may be highly uncertain. In this usage one speaks of the risk of cigarette 
smoking, the risk of war, benefit-risk analysis, but the chance, not risk, of winning the Irish 
Sweepstakes. See notes 4 and 44 infra for alternate usages of the term "risk." 
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which distinguish environmental risk from traditional environmental prob­
lems make environmental risk problems less susceptible to management 
through existing regulatory , legal , and economic institutions . 
The purposes of this Article are: (l) to define the characteristics 
common to environmental risk problems; (2) to distinguish environmental 
risk from classical pollution problems of water and air pollution ; (3) to 
highlight factors which make environmental risk problems particularly dif­
ficult to manage; and (4) to suggest a direction in management more suited 
to the .characteristics of environmental risk and hence more l ikely to be 
effective than the current approach . 
I 
THE NATURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK 
A. Characteristics Common to Environmental Risk Problems
1. Introduction
At the !eve] of physical mechanism , environmental risk problems may 
differ strikingly one from another . One may require the expertise of an 
atmospheric chemist , another that of a nuclear engineer , and still another 
that of an oncologis t .  However , at a more abstract level than physical 
mechanism, environmental risk problems share common characteristics .  
This section seeks t o  describe these characteristics and t o  detail their impli­
cations for the management of environmental risk problems. The discussion 
begins with characteristics abstracted from the problems just mentioned­
nuclear power , synthetic chemicals ,  ozone depletion , and recombinant 
DNA. The nine characteristics to be proposed will not apply with equal 
vigor to every environmental problem, but the specification of these charac­
teristics will help to define the nature of these risk problems and to clarify 
how one problem differs from another. Toxic chemicals can be viewed , 
then ,  as an especial ly important subgroup of a larger class of risk problems . 
Of the nine characteristics , the first four-ignorance of mechanism, 
modest benefits , catastrophic costs , and low probability of catastrophe­
emphasize the uncertainties surrounding environmental risk decision 
making . These four characteristics are often the focus of cost-benefit analy­
sis . The remaining five characteristics-internal benefits ,  external costs , 
collective risk , latency , and irreversibility of effect-bear more directly on 
institutional problems encountered in the management of environmental 
risks . 
2. Characteristics Related to Zero-Infinity Dilemma
Ignorance of mechanism is the· first characteristic of environmental risk 
problems. The present state of knowledge of the mechanisms by which a 
risk is effected is both limited and limiting. Ignorance of mechanism may be 
present at any number of levels of risk creation , from the generation of the 
hazard (e. g. , the release of radiation from the nuclear fuel cycle) or trans-
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mission of the hazard's effect (e.g., dispersion of radiation in the ambient 
environment or food chain) to an organism's response to exposure , particu­
larly.health-related responses (e.g., sensitivity to "hot particles" and other 
forms of radiation) . The mechanisms of generation , transmission , and 
response are understood so poorly that any management of these problems is 
truly decision making under pervasive uncertainty. 
Largely because of this ignorance of mechanism, each environmental 
risk problem presents a gamble concerning the effect of a particular action. 
To illustrate , consider a simplified case of environmental risk for which 
there are just two hypotheses. 2 Under one hypothesis , freon hair spray 
propellants do not deplete the ozone layer of the atmosphere , so there is no 
harmful environmental effect from their use. Under the second hypothesis , 
freon propellants do deplete the ozone layer, thereby producing a specific 
environmental effect which may be enormous but is not precisely known. 
The potential for catastrophic costs is the second common characteris­
tic of environmental risk. What little is known about mechanism in each 
case establishes that each is a gamble with high stakes . But what is not 
known about mechanism precludes specification of just howcatastrophic 
and likely the costs might be. Ignorance of mechanism colors the next two 
characteristics as well. 
The third characteristic is a relatively modest benefit associated with 
the environmental risk gamble. Although some may feel that the benefits of 
nuclear power and recombinant DNA are not small compared with the 
potential cost , there appears to be at some level a strong asymmetry between 
potential costs and benefits ,  for all four examples , and for most other 
environmental risks. For nuclear power there is the asymmetrical gamble of 
a little more shielding and a little more care in waste disposal for a little 
lower probability of radiation release. Similarly , for recombinant DNA 
there is the gamble of a l ittle more care in experimental procedures for a 
little lower chance that a newly created disease will escape. The situation 
with spray cans and ozone depletion is more clear cut. The benefits of 
fluorocarbons can be directly measured in markets in terms of a cheaper and 
finer spray compared with the alternativ�s. which include pump spray . 
These benefits accrue regardless of the potential effects of the fluorocarbons 
on the ozone layer. They appear modest indeed compared with the poten­
tially catastrophic costs which might result from ozone depletion. Corre­
spondingly , for the potentially toxic chemical Red Dye No. 40, the benefit 
is the cosmetic effect the color provides in foods . Again this benefit is 
2 .  The hypotheses are called "simple" in statistical theory because there is  only one 
hypothesized alternative. In actual cases things are not so simple. The number and kinds of 
outcomes are unclear, and so is the probability associated with each potential outcome. 
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modest compared with the potential of the chemical as a carcinogen . This 
asymmetry in the orders of magnitude of potential costs and benefits has 
important implications for environmental decision making in terms of the 
degree of proof necessary to warrant precautionary action. 3 
An environmental risk gamble may be thought of as a seesaw with the 
potential costs on one side of the pivot and the potential benefits on the 
other. The distances from the pivot represent the relative magnitudes of 
benefits and costs. Figure 1 illustrates the freon propellant example. The 
distance from zero to B represents the benefit of the convenience of using 
propellants. Foregoing this convenience is the cost of opting out of the 
gamble. The distance from zero to C-B represents the net cost of taking the 
gamble and losing. The net cost is the potential , relatively large "catas­
trophic" cost reduced by the comparatively small benefit of using propel­
lants that will accrue even if propellants do deplete the ozone. 
In Figure I the potential costs , due to their greater magnitude , are 
considerably farther from the pivot than the modest benefits. If both hypoth­
eses were of equal weight the seesaw would tip toward the potentially great 
loss. Common sense then suggests that the gamble is too risky to undertake . 
Net Costs and Benefits Associated with Two Hypotheses 
FIGURE I 
Net costs if the second 
(11catastrophic1{ hypothesis Net benefits if the first is true _'!\ /("benign11) hypothesis is (CL- Bl 
O B !rue 
cosfs A benefits 
However , there is a dilemma. There often are reasons to believe that 
the probabilities of the safe and catastrophic hypotheses are not equal and 
that the catastrophic outcome is considerably less likely than the favorable 
outcome. For many potentially toxic chemicals , and for nuclear power, 
ozone depletion , and recombinant DNA , what little is known about mecha­
nism suggests that the probability of the catastrophic outcome is low , much 
lower than the probability of the favorable outcome. Just how low is 
impossible to say with confidence , because of the incomplete knowledge of 
mechanism. Due to the fragmentary knowledge of mechanism, the likeli­
hood of the catastrophic hypothesis cannot be determined objectively , but 
must be assessed subjectively ,  based upon whatever knowledge is available. 
Low subjective probability of the catastrophic outcome is the fourth 
characteristic of environmental risk. Common sense suggests that the low 
3.  See text accompanying notes 78-79 infra. 
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subjective probability of the catastrophic costs should be taken into account 
in balancing costs and benefits. In terms of the seesaw illustration, the 
probabilities of the benign and catastrophic hypotheses can be thought of as 
weights placed upon the seesaw at distances from the pivot equal to the 
magnitude of the respective potential costs and benefits. A heavy weight 
close to the pivot can more than balance a light weight farther from the 
pivot. With a low subjective probability of the catastrophic outcome and a 
high subjective probability of the favorable outcome, it is no longer clear 
which way the seesaw will tip. The fourth characteristic , low subjective 
probability of the potential catastrophe , introduces a second asymmetry 
which tends to counterbalance the asymmetry of potential high costs and 
modest benefits. 
Whether the greater likelihood of the favorable outcome compensates 
for its smaller relative size is a fundamental question of environmental risk 
management. In the extreme case , the problem is called a "zero-infinity 
dilemma": a virtually zero probability of a virtually infinite catastrophe. 
In the seesaw illustration , common sense may suggest that an environ­
mental risk is worth taking as long as the seesaw , with the probability 
weights added, tips in the direction of the benign hypothesis .  This interpre­
tation is formally equivalent to the expected value criterion, which says that 
a gamble is worth taking only if the product of the benefits and their 
l ikelihood is greater than the product of the adverse outcome and its 
likelihood.4 The analogy to the seesaw is used to suggest that the expected 
value criterion has some natural appeal as a way of balancing potential costs 
and benefits and their probabilities . 
There are obvious limitations to the expected value criterion. It focuses 
on outcomes rather than processes; because of the uncertainties involved it 
may be difficult or even impossible to estimate the magnitudes of the 
outcomes or their probabilities . 5 The various uncertainties surrounding the 
4. If B represents the benefits from a risky gamble and (C-B) the net costs if the 
catastrophic hypothesis turns out to be true, the gamble is worth taking under the expected 
value criterion if p(C-B) < (l-p)B, where p is the probability of the catastrophic hypothesis 
and (l -p) is the probability of the benign hypothesis. In the more general case where there are 
several or many hypotheses and many potential outcomes, each with its probability of occur­
rence, the formula for expected value of the gamble is 
(l ) Ip ;q; 
where Pi is the probability of the ith possible outcome; if q; is positive it is a benefit; if qi is 
negative it is a cost. The expected value criterion says that the gamble is worth taking if 
I p;q;>O. The analogy works because the torque of a lever (or seesaw) is determined by the 
same formula (l), with Pi the ith weight placed C!i distance from the pivot (qi is negative if it is to 
the left of the pivot). The torque is clockwise if Ipiq;>O. In the example of Figure 2, p1=p, 
q1=C-B, P2=0-p), and qi=B. 
In a second distinct usage, risk is sometimes defined to mean expected value, as in (l). To 
avoid confusion this usage of risk will be avoided. See, in addition, note 44 infra. 
5. The expected value criterion also does not help resolve questions of equity, irreversi­
bility, and social risk aversion. These qualifications to the expected value criterion are dis­
cussed at text accompanying notes 80-84 infra. 
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quantification of costs , benefits , and probabilities are illustrated in Figure 2. 
The range of uncertainty associated with benefits , represented by a, is the 
uncertainty of efficacy. In the freon propellant example , it is not clear how 
well freon works as a propellant . The corresponding range of uncertainty 
associated with costs, represented by b, is typically much larger than the 
uncertainty of efficacy . In addition , there is uncertainty as to the likelihood 
of each hypothesis (c and d). 
Costs ond Benefits Weighted by Probability 
FIGURE 2 
B -
0 11 c dl, 
A<-l a 
costs 
benefits 
The uncertainties surrounding the potential costs,  benefits , and prob­
abilities often are so strong that the decision maker avoids numerical 
quantification altogether . Even so, the magnitudes of the costs , benefits, 
and probabilities are essential considerations in environmental risk decisipn 
making , and informal estimations of costs , benefits , and probabilities 
cannot be avoided . Moreover, a decision to forego a final verdict on a 
chemical's use and to allow , or prevent, its use pending the collection of 
more information , is still a decision made under uncertainty . 
3. Characteristics Related to Institutional Management of Environmental
Risk
The five remaining characteristics common to environmental risk prob­
lems bear more directly on the institutional problems encountered in tKeir 
management . The first of these is the internal transfer of benefits associated 
with these risks . In the case of freon propellants ,  the benefits-added 
convenience and possibly lower manufacturing costs-are transferred 
through markets and reflected in product prices . The economic term for 
costs and benefits which are thus transferred is "internal . "  
I n  contrast t o  a n  internal transfer , the adverse effects o f  environmental 
risk gambles usually are transferred directly through the environment rather 
than through the market . A direct , non-market transfer of an effect is called 
an economic externality . 6 The external trans/ er of costs is the sixth charac-
6. See T. PAGE, ECONOM ICS OF IN VOLUNTARY TRANSFERS: A UNIFIED APPROACH TO 
POLLUTION AND CONGESTION 40-81  ( 1 973). 
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teristic of environmental risk . 7 The failure of markets to internalize these 
potentially catastrophic costs is the primary reason for regulation of environ­
mental risk problems .  
The asymmetry between internal benefits and external costs , added to 
the asymmetry of the potential magnitudes of costs and benefits ("zero­
infinity dilemma"), increases the strain on institutional management of 
environmental risk . The market failure associated with environmental risk is 
likely to be more severe than if both benefits and potential costs were 
external and offsetting , with the same group receiving the benefits also 
bearing the risks . 
The seventh characteristic of environmental risk, collective risk, is also 
related to the environment,� transfer of effect .8 A risk is collective when it is 
borne by many people sfmultaneously . Since environmental transfer often 
means a diffusion of effect ,  major environmental risk problems have the 
potential to affect mill ions of people at the same time . The effectiveness of 
insurance, liability law ,  and other traditional compensatory mechanisms in 
protecting against Joss resulting from risk is limited in the case of collective 
risk . The larger the potential loss and the more widespread its effects ,  the 
more difficult it is to insure .9 Society is more averse to collective risks than 
to individual risks , 10 which often are managed through insurance markets . 
The eighth characteristic of environmental risk is latency, the extended 
delay between the initiation of a hazard , or exposure to i t ,  and the manifesta­
tion of its effect .  For many carcinogens , the latency is from 20 to 30 years. 
Indeed , the mutagenic effect of a chemical may not show up for several 
generations . As a result of latency ,  those bearing environmental risks may 
not be the ones enjoying the benefits of the decision . Moreover, in most 
cases, latency is sufficiently long and the risk sufficiently diffuse so that the 
risk is borne involuntarily ,  if not unknowingly . Since an acute , or short­
term , effect usually is much easier to discover and trace than a chronic , or 
long-term effect , long latencies increase the l ikelihood that the potential 
effects of environmental risks will be masked by other factors . 
7. E��ronmental transfer does not imply an externality and an externality does not 
imply an environmental transfer. Noise in a machine shop is environmentally transferred to the 
workers' ears; however, if the workers bargain for higher wages in return for accepting the 
noise, it is also a market-compensated transfer and hence not an externality. (How well such 
markets work in practice is an important question, as is discussed at text accompanying note 1 2  
infra.). Conver.sely, not all externalities involve transfer through a n  environmental medium; 
bequests and theft are external but not environmental in transfer. 
8. Not all potential environmental transfers are collective risks. Lightning strikes one or 
few at a time and is hardly a collective risk. Conversely, a risk may be collectively borne 
without being environmentally transferred. While many examples of collective risk are also 
examples of environmental transfer of effect (e.g., floods, nuclear war, ozone depletion), some 
are not (e.g. , the potential of a recession with its collective risk of mass unemployment). 
9. A prime example is the unwillingness of private insurance companies to insure against 
losses from nuclear power plant disasters. 
10. See text accompanying note 82 infra for further discussion. 
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The ninth characteristic of environmental risk is irreversibility. Even 
when an effect is theoretically reversible , as a practical matter there are 
important elements of irreversibility when reversal of the effect inescapably 
requires a long time , especially when reversal entails a high cost in addition 
to a long time . Irreversibility can be essentially absolute, as is the case with 
plutonium's half-life of 24,000 years . It can also be measured on a scale of 
tens of generations , as is the case with mutagens . In the freon propellant 
example , the stratospheric effects of ozone depletion might last a hundred 
years after fluorocarbon emissions are stopped . Within this essentially 
irreversible period of stratospheric change , however , the resulting climate 
modification could produce further irreversible effects , such as species 
extinction. 
The last two characteristics ,  latency and irreversibility of effect , have 
profound ethical and institutional implications . They raise questions 
concerning fair distributions of risk over time and how institutions can be 
designed to anticipate adverse effects ,  rather than merely to react to exist­
ing , known effects . 11 
4. A Typology of Related Problems
Environmental risk can now be defined as the class of problems having
the foregoing nine characteristics . These characteristics are shown schemat­
ically in Figure 3 (on page 2 1 7). A typology of related problems subject to 
analysis based on these nine characteristics is  presented in Table 1. This 
table facilitates use of the nine characteristics to determine whether , and to 
what extent , a particular problem is of the environmental risk type. 
An "X" in the column underneath a particular characteristic indicates 
that it occurs in the corresponding problem. A typical environmental risk 
problem, as illustrated by the first example in Table 1 (ozone depletion due 
to use of freon propellants), exhibits all nine characteristics .  A "-X" 
indicates that the problem under consideration exhibits the opposite charac­
teristic . 
TABLE I 
TYPOLOGY OF RELATED PROBLEMS 
TYPOLOGY OF RELATED PROBLEMS 
Environmental risk (ozone depletion) 
Environmental rilk-major benefit (C02) 
Drugs and food additives (red dye 'IF 40) 
Occupational accident (hand in machine) 
Occupational exposure to "toxics1 (BCME) 
Public health (smallpox eradication) 
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1 1 .  See text accompanying notes 82-84 infra for further discussion. 
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The benefits associated with an environmental gamble are not always 
relatively small but may be of the same order of magnitude as the potential 
costs . The most obvious example is the carbon dioxide (C02) "greenhouse" 
problem resulting from the burning of fossil fuel . The benefits of fossil fuel 
combustion are so large that precautionary steps are unlikely and perhaps 
unwarranted unless the probability of catastrophic climatological change is 
substantial. Aside from this characteristic-that the benefit is major rather 
than modest relative to the potential cost-the C02 greenhouse problem is 
like the "pure" environmental risk problem in its other characteristic s .  
Food additives and drugs also create problems exhibiting some , but not 
all ,  of the characteristics of environmental risk . While these problems are 
not strict environmental problems in the sense that both the hazards and the 
benefits are transferred through market mechanisms rather than through the 
environment , most problems associated with food additives and drugs do 
share the other characteristics of environmental risk . To illustrate , consider 
that virtually everyone in the United States is subject to the risk associated 
with Red Dye No. 40 . When consumers are unaware of the hazards as­
sociated with market products or when the information is too complicated to 
evaluate , the distinction between an internal , voluntary transfer through a 
market mechanism and an external , involuntary transfer through an environ­
mental mechanism becomes blurred . As a result of this less than clear 
distinction , there is a continuum of chemical risk problems ranging from 
market-transferred risks , such as pesticide residues on food , to environmen­
taliy-transferred risks such as lead in the air . 
A similar continuum based on the degree of awareness of potential 
hazards exists for risks encountered in occupational settings . At one ex­
treme , the risk of physical injury for a particular job is clear . Accident 
records over extended periods will provide a precise and actuarial definition 
of the risk. Workers who know the risk and have a choice of other jobs may 
bargain for wage premiums to compensate for the risk . Although the risk 
may be potentially catastrophic for the individual (e. g. , the risk of a 
disabling injury or death) the premiums are typically small on a daily basis 
because , even for hazardous jobs,  the probability of a catastrophic accident 
on a given day is very small . To the extent that workers have information 
and choice , the market weighs the level of the probability against the size of 
the potential catastrophe . Since most physical accidents involve small num­
bers of people, the accidents are not collective risks. 
The picture changes when the risks are less visible . Workers handling 
toxic chemicals have little or no information with which to evaluate the risk . 
Since the underlying toxic mechanism may not be understood and the effect 
may be latent , the risk takes on an external , involuntary character . 12 
1 2 .  For further discussion see R. SMITH, THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT: 
ITS GOAL AND ITS ACHIEVEMENTS 30-34 ( 1 976). 
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The characteristics of environmental risk are also useful in the analysis 
of problems when the emphasis is on the societal benefits of an action 
rather than the risks. Certain public health problems are mirror images of 
environmental risk , but with the cost and the benefit roles reversed. Perhaps 
the best example is the United Nations smallpox eradication program. The 
smallpox problem, like the freon propellant example, can be treated as a 
"pure" case of two hypotheses.13 Under one hypothesis, smallpox has no 
nonhuman carriers. If this hypothesis is true, the innoculation of humans 
could eradicate the disease for all time. Under the second hypothesis, there 
are nonhuman carriers of the virus. If this hypothesis is true, innoculation of 
humans makes possible control, but not eradication, of the disease. 14 
If eradication is successful, benefits external to markets accrue as an 
improvement in the quality of the environment. In contrast, the costs of the 
program are internal to markets. The costs are in the production of serum, 
health workers, transportation, and information gathering. The costs of the 
eradication program, over and above the ongoing costs of control, are very 
modest when compared with the potential benefits of eradication. Eradica­
tion is irreversible if successful, but there is a substantial time delay from the 
initiation of the program until its effects are learned. In preventive medicine 
the benefits are latent but the program costs are immediate.15 As Table 1 
indicates, the characteristics of the smallpox eradication gamble are similar 
to those of environmental risk, as schematized in Figure 3, but with the roles 
of costs and benefits reversed. 
B. Environmental Risk and Classical Pollution 
1. Introduction
The nine characteristics common to environmental risk problems also
serve as a basis for distinction between environmental risk and more tradi­
tional environmental problems. Many environmental risk problems are the 
by-products of new,  post-World War II technologies. Although certain 
long-existing environmental problems exhibit some of the characteristics of 
1 3. See note 2 supra. 
1 4 .  An earlier program to eradicate yellow fever failed because there are monkeys that 
carry the disease. 
15. Henderson, The Eradication of Smallpox, 235 SCIENTIFIC AM. 25-33 ( 1 972). A rever­
sal of roles of the characteristics of environmental risk is considered further in Part II of this 
Article. 
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environmental risk, 16 there are differences in degree between many of the 
old, "classical" pollution problems and newer environmental risks. These 
differences can be described in terms of seriousness, relative costs, num­
bers, potency, timing, and visibility. Since the problems of environmental 
risk differ to such a large degree from classical pollution problems, we must 
1 6. Manmade environmental risks often are compared with age-old environmental risks 
such as floods, earthquakes, tornadoes, and meteorites. See, e. g., R. Kates, Assessing the Risk 
of Environmental Hazard, Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment, Background 
Paper No. 4, Risk Assessment Workshop, Woods Hole, Massachusetts, March 3 1  - April 4,  
1 975, at  32-33, 39.  While these comparisons can be highly useful, there are important differ­
ences discussed later in this Article in the assessment and confidence of probabilities, voluntari­
ness and equity, role of human error, and benefit associated with the risk. 
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question the abil ity of our present legal and regulatory institutions to effec­
tively manage and control these more recent environmental risk problems . 
2. Seriousness: Amenity Versus Life Threat 
The classical water pollution problems which dominated public and 
scientific concern until a few years ago were suspended solids, biological 
oxygen demand , eutrophicants ,  and detergents .  Governmental regulation 
and resource commitment still are concentrated in these four areas, espe­
cially the first two . Although some classical water pollution problems , such 
as micro-biological contamination , directly affect human health , much of 
the concern over these four classical problems stems from the immediacy of 
their effect on amenities such as clear water and less algae . In contrast with 
the classical water pollutants are pollutants such as suspected carcinogens, 
mutagens , and heavy metals . 1 7 These "environmental risk" pollutants pose 
long-term, serious threats of uncertain likelihood to health and life . The 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act 1 8 provides for regulation of environ­
mental risk pollutants ,  separate from classical pollutants, under the hazard­
ous pollutants section . 19 However, this section until recently has been 
largely unenforced . 20 
The contrast between amenity value and l ife threat is sl ightly less 
pronounced in the case of classical air pollutants than in the case of classical 
water pollutants. These air pollutants ,  which continue to dominate govern­
mental concern, are sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, particulates, hydrocar­
bons, oxidants, and carbon monoxide . Although these pollutants are per­
ceived as direct health threats,2 1 the emphasis had been on their short-term, 
milder effects, such as irritation to the eyes from oxidants, headaches from 
carbon monoxide , and respiratory distress, rather than on their long-term , 
potentially more severe health effects . A common assumption is that air 
pollution primarily affects the weak, with little effect on the healthy . 22 
1 7 .  See, e.g. , R. Harris ,  The Implications of Cancer-Causing Substances in Mississippi 
River Water ( 1 974) (unpublished report for the Environmental Defense Fund). 
1 8 .  33 U . S . C . A .  §§ 1 25 1 - 1 376 (West Supp. 1 978) . 
1 9 .  Id. § 1 3 1 7(a) . 
20. It was only after three environmental groups sued to compel enforcement and ob­
tained an agreement from EPA to set standards that most chemicals were regulated . NRDC v .  
Train , 8 ERC 2 1 20 (D.C . Cir .  1 976) (consent agreement) . The settlement agreement and 
amendments to the Act codifying many of its terms are discussed in  Doniger, Federal Regula­
tion of Vinyl Chloride: A Short Course in the Law and Policy of Toxic Substances Control, 7 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 497, 627-29 (1978). 
2 1 . In the early part of the 20th century , air pollution was widely perceived as a nuisance 
affecting amenities such as visibil ity .  Gradually ,  the concern has shifted toward health, which 
became the dominant focus of the Clean Air Act . 
22. According to Joseph Stuart, executive officer of the South Coast Air Qual ity Manage­
ment District (Los Angeles Basin),  "Southern California is  not unhealthy for healthy persons , 
but can be unhealthy for residents with respiratory problems . "  Bernste in ,  Smog Forecasts for 
Area Issued in New Format , Los Angeles Times, Dec .  1 3 ,  1 977, Part I ,  at I, 29 . This statement 
assumes that there is no long-term, latent hazard associated with Los Angeles air for presently 
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Although the classical air pollutants are directly associated with life 
threat and higher mortality , the relatively minor and short term effects of 
carbon monoxide contrast with the potentially global catastrophic 
greenhouse effect of carbon dioxide . It is noteworthy that while the classical 
pollutant, carbon monoxide, is presently controlled, its environmental risk 
cousin, carbon dioxide, is not . As in the case of water , other environmental 
risk air pollutants are carcinogens and mutagens.23 
In the case of land contamination, there is a clear distinction between 
amenity value and l ife threat . Litter is an example of a classical pollutant ; it 
is vexing , immediate, and in the aggregate expensive , but hardly life 
threatening . In contrast, the contamination by polybrominated biphenyls 
(PBB) of large areas of Michigan farmlands is a paradigm of an environ­
mental risk gamble that resulted in tragedy . 24 
3. Relative Costs: False Negatives and False Positives 
By definition, the potential costs of environmental risks are great and 
the benefits are generally modest . Correspondingly ,  there is asymmetry in 
the costs of making wrong decisions . For classical pollutants , the asymme­
try of potential costs and benefits, and hence the potential costs of wrong 
decisions, are likely to be less pronounced than for environmental risk 
pollutants .  
healthy persons , o r  n o  gradual shift from the healthy to unhealthy category. 
Similarly ,  the EPA air quality index (Pollutant Standards Index) focuses on short term 
effects .  For example , its interpretation of the " very unhealthfu l"  range is  "s ignificant aggrava­
tion of symptoms and decreased exercise tolerance in persons with heart or lung disease , with 
widespread symptoms in  the healthy population. " Will iam F.  Hunt, Jr . , Office of Air and 
Waste Management , U . S .  Environmental Protection Agency ,  The U . S .  Env ironmental Protec­
tion Agency ' s  Recommended Pollutant Standards Index (PSI) ,  at 8 & Table 1 (paper presented
at 69th Annual Meeting of the Air Pollution Control Association, Portland , Ore . ,  June 29 , 1 976). 
Cancer risk is not a part of the interpretation of the various categories from "good" to 
"hazardous ." The index is  based upon the five classic pollutants :  total suspended particulates ,  
ozone , nitrogen dioxide , carbon monoxide , and sulfur dioxide ; and the interpretation is  based 
upon health effects, primarily short-term ones ,  of these five pollutants .  Hydrocarbons,  an 
. aggregate class which includes many of the carcinogens and suspected carcinogens,  are ex-
cluded from the index "because there are no direct health effects associated with the pollu­
tant . "  Id. at 2. 
In a prel iminary study ,  KVB , Inc. of Tustin,  California, identified 1 28 organics or groups 
of organics in the Los Angeles air basin ,  including n-dodecane , chloroform, dichloromethane, 
carbon tetrabromide , vinyl chloride , benzene , and isomers of xylene . H.J .  Taback ,  T.W . 
Sonnichsen, N. Brunetz & J. L. Stredler, Control of Hydrocarbon Emissions from Stationary 
Sources in the California South Coast Air Basin: Final Report ( 1 978) (study for California Air 
Resources Board to be released after ARB approval) .  Also in the Los Angeles area , Robert 
Gordon has identified 14 polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, including benzo(a)anthracene and 
benzo(a)pyrene, both carcinogens.  Gordon, Distribution of Airborne Polycyclic A romatic Hyd­
rocarbons , IO ENVT'L Sci. & TECH.  370 ( 1 976).
23. See note 22 supra . 
24. See generally Carter ,  Michigan's PBB Incident: Chemical Mix-Up, Leads to Disaster, 
1 92 SCIENCE 240 ( 1 976). 
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The concept of false negatives and false positives helps to illustrate this 
distinction.  In criminal law, two basic kinds of mistakes can occur: the jury 
(or judge) can find a guilty man innocent or an innocent man guilty . Testing 
chemicals for toxicity presents the same problem .  Test results may indicate 
that a toxic chemical is not toxic or that a non-toxic chemical is toxic. The 
former type of error is called a false negative and the latter a false positive . 
In environmental risk assessment, the latter type of error is labeled a false 
alarm, but (perhaps significantly) there is  no common name for the former 
error. For want of better terms, this discussion uses false negative and false 
positive to refer to these two types of errors in environmental risk decision 
making . 
The costs of wrong decisions are asymmetric for environmental risk in 
inverse proportion to the potential net costs and benefits associated with 
each of the two hypotheses .  25 The cost of a false negative-deciding that the 
benign hypothesis is true when it is not-is much higher than the cost of a 
false positive-deciding that the catastrophic hypothesis is true when it is 
not . In the former case, the catastrophic results more than offset the modest 
benefits of erroneously accepting the benign hypothesis .  In the latter case, 
the costs are equal only to the loss of modest benefits incurred by rejecting 
the benign hypothesis . The concepts of false negative and false positive, and 
the related asymmetric costs associated with decision making mistakes, are 
important in the analysis of environmental risk management . 26 
4. Numbers 
One of the more striking attributes of classical pollutants is that there 
are so few of them. In the case of air pollution, the old National Air 
Pollution Control Administration s ingled out only a small number of pollu­
tants for intensive study and regulation . There were just six "criteria" 
pollutants for which standards were written by 1971.  27 The prevailing 
opinion was that a small number of "defendable" standards was better than 
a larger number of less defendable ones .  28 Since then, the list of criteria 
pollutants has not expanded . The criteria pollutants are either common 
chemicals (sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, and carbon monoxide) or undif­
ferentiated hydrocarbons, particulates, and oxidants (primarily ozone) . A 
recent Environmental Protection Agency statement that air quality has 
substantially improved was based on this short list of criteria, or classical, 
25 . See note 2 supra and accompanying text . 
26. See text accompanying notes 60-84 infra . 
27 . Notice of promulgation of air quality criteria documents for these pol lutants was 
given as follows: 34 Fed. Reg. 1 988 ( 1 969) (particulate matter and sulfur oxides) ; 35 Fed. Reg. 
4768 ( 1 970) (carbon monoxide, photochemical oxidants,  and hydrocarbons) ;  36 Fed. Reg. 1 502 
( 1 97 1 )  (nitrogen oxides). Ambient air quality standards for all s ix pollutants were established in 
1 97 1 .  EPA , National Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Standards , 36 Fed. Reg. 8 1 86 ( 1 97 1 ) .  
28. Interview with Yaun Newil l ,  National Air Pollution Control Administration (1968) . 
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pollutants .29 From the standpoint of environmental risk, however, there are 
thousands of potentially hazardous chemicals requiring attention . 
The situation is similar in the case of water pollution . While the 
classical focus of attention and regulatory control has been on just two 
pollutants, biological oxygen demand and suspended solids, from the stand­
point of environmental risk there are hundreds of chemicals deserving 
attention. Until recently, synthetic organic chemicals have been neglected . 30 
The problems of research and control presented by the large number of 
environmental risk pollutants are compounded by possible interaction 
among these pollutants . Testing chemicals one by one often is not satisfac­
tory because the interactions may be highly nonlinear . An otherwise harm­
less chemical may increase the potency of a carcinogenic chemical with 
which it comes in contact . For example, benzo(a)pyrene and benzo(a)an­
thracene are carcinogenic on mouse skin but their potency is increased a 
thousandfold in the presence of n-dodecane, which is noncarcinogenic by 
itself . 3 1  This is an example of a synergistic interaction, an interaction in 
which the total effect of two chemicals may be greater than the sum of the 
effects of the individual chemicals .  Synergistic interactions create problems 
in the use of statistical inference to predict chemical effects . While each 
chemical may have a statistically insignificant toxic or carcinogenic effect 
on its own, its effect in combination may be significant . Analysis on an 
individual basis, a typical approach for classical pollution, can miss these 
combined effects . 
5. Potency 
Concentrations of environmental risk pollutants are typically much 
lower than concentrations of classical pollutant s .  Classical pollutants often 
are measured in parts-per-million (ppm), while environmental risk candi­
dates often appear at the parts-per-billion (ppb) level . Experts in the man­
agement of traditional pollutants occasionally have dismissed environmental 
risk problems simply on the basis of their low concentrations . 32 However, a 
29. See PROGRESS IN THE PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF AIR POLLUTION IN 1 975,  ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY TO THE CONGRESS 
OR-THE UNITED STATES IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 3 1 3  OF PUBLIC LAW 9 1 -604, THE CLEAN 
AIR ACT, AS AMENDED 8 ( 1 976) . Although it is  encouraging to see downward trends in  several of 
the classical pollutants. it is perhaps premature to conclude that "the air qual ity " is  improving 
without a better understanding of the roles and trends of the several thousand candidate 
pollutants of environmental risk. 
30 .  In  the Mississippi River, for example , less than five percent of the organic fraction 
has been identified and only a fraction of this five percent has been tested for carcinogen ity . 
Interview with Robert Harris, Environmental Defense Fund. See also text accompanying notes 
1 8- 1 9  supra. 
3 1 . It appears that all three chemicals are present in Los Angeles air . See note 22 supra. 
32 . E . g . , the response of Carmen Guarino, Philadelphia Water Commissioner and now a 
member of the EPA advisory panel on drinking water quality , to the finding that chloroethyl­
ether was present in Philadelphia water in  concentrations of 0.5 ppb.: such a " minute quantity" 
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conclusion based upon experience with classical pollutants is misleading . 
Some carcinogens are potent at extremely low concentrations .  Aflatoxin , for 
example ,  is carcinogenic at the 100 parts-per-trillion level . 33 
6. Timing 
A defining characteristic of environmental risk is a latent period , with 
l ittle or no warning of manifestation of adverse effect during the interim .  In 
contrast , a number of the adverse effects of classical pollution are quickly 
apparent . Examples include algae from eutrophicants ,  suds from detergents , 
eye irritation from oxidants ,  and respiratory distress from other classical air 
pollutants . Legal and regulatory agencies respond more readily to problems 
with immediate manifestations , as opposed to problems whose effects be­
come apparent only in the future . 
7. Visibility 
Some commentators have suggested that environmental risk problems 
are more visible than other environmental problems due to the dramatic 
nature of the potential catastrophe . 34 However , the long latencies , ignorance 
i s  " like making .a martini with one ounce of vermouth to 156 railroad tank cars of gin, . . .  l ike 
the width of your fingers compared to the distance from Philadelphia to San Francisco . "  Heick, 
Water Dept. Adds Tests, Treatment ,  Philadelphia Inquirer, Apr. 19, 1915 (quoting Guarino) . 
In responding to The Implications of Cancer-Causing Substances in Mississippi River 
Water, supra note 1 7 ,  I . M .  Levitt , the Executive Director of Philadelphia's Mayor ' s  Science 
and Advisory Counci l ,  wrote : 
The paramount question i s :  Are these chemicals concentrated in sufficient quantity to 
adversely affect our health? The answer in both cases ,  at  least for Philadelphia, is that 
these chemicals do not exist in  that abundance. 
[Harris] is as correct as I am when I say there is  gold in the streets of Philadelphia.
Spectrographic evidence would substantiate this statement. However, nobody is  going 
to mine gold in the streets of Philadelphia. The concentration is simply too low. 
S imilarly the presence of these toxic agents which are in the food we eat, the 
water we drink, the air we breathe , and , indeed , are present in some of the clothes we 
wear , are of such concentrations that they do not constitute a health hazard . 
Levitt, Philadelphia Water Gets an OK, The [Philadelphia] Evening Bulletin, Mar. 1 4 ,  1915. 
A part-per-bill ion is clearly a very small number, but it still means roughly 100 million 
trill ion molecules of the carcinogen per liter of water. There is evidence that cancers start from 
single cells and it is believed that a single molecule may be enough to start a cancer. See Crump, 
Hoel ,  Langley & Peto , Fundamental Carcinogenic Processes and Their Implications for Low
Dose Risk Assessment ,  36 CANCER RESEARCH 2973 ,  2977 (1976) ; Cornfield, Carcinogenic Risk 
Assessment , 1 98 SCIENCE 693 , 696 ( 1 977) . 
3 3 .  1 INTERNATIONAL AGENCY FOR RESEARCH ON CANCER, !ARC MONOGRAPHS ON THE 
E V A L U ATION OF CARCINOGENIC RISK OF CHEMICA LS TO MAN 1 49 ( 1972) .  
34 . See, e.g. , Blair & Hoerger, Toxic Substances Legislation-Regulators vs.  Science (pt .
2) ,  2 ENVT'L PoL'Y & L.  1 38 ,  1 38-40 ( 1 976) . 
Curiously,  the large size of effect may actually work against salience by providing grounds 
for ad hominem attack on the basis  of "hysteria" of the opponents of the risk. For just one 
example , Dixy Lee Ray criticized President Carter for his opposition to the Clinch River 
reactor : " I t ' s all misunderstand ing and hysteria . . . .  I guess he was frightened in his mother 's  
womb. The chances of  a nuclear disaster in a power plant are one in five bill ion. You 've got 
more chance of being squashed by a fall ing meteor . "  Newsmakers: Dixy Ray Gives the 
President an Earful,  Los Angeles Times ,  Feb. 28 , 1 978,  pt. I ,  at 2.  The confusion of subjective 
and objective probabilities i s  d iscussed at text accompanying notes 43-45 infra .  
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of mechanisms , and low subjective probabilities of effect characteristic of 
environmental risks suggest that these problems may actually be less visible 
than classical pollution problems . 35 Dr . Farley Fisher , head of the Early 
Warning Program of the Office of Toxic Substances of EPA, puts the matter 
forthrightly : "Few people in government are rewarded for 20 or 30 year 
predictions ,  especially when the probabilities are low . You are rewarded for 
pulling together existing information which foretells of a crisis six months 
from now with I 00 percent certainty . "36 
Moreover , the visibility of a particular environmental risk problem may 
be obscured by the large number of these problems . Scientist s ,  regulatory 
institutions ,  and the public may , for example , overlook the carcinogenicity 
of a chemical s imply because there are too many other recognized carcino­
gens which warrant attention. 
Further invisibility results from the extremely low concentrations as­
sociated with many environmental risk pollutants .  Thus , environmental risk 
problems arguably are not visible enough . Without direct analysis of percep­
tion formation, the most that can be said is that important differences 
between the visibility of classical pollution and the visibility of ,environmen­
tal risk are a likely consequence of some of the characteristics of environ­
mental risk . 
II 
DIFFICULTIES IN THE MANAGEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK 
A. Introduction 
In the last section , environmental risk was distinguished from classical 
pollution in several respects .  Yet the development of legal , regulatory , and 
economic institutions for the management and control of environmental 
problems has been primarily from the classical perspective . At the begin­
ning of this Article it was mentioned that the defining charactistics of 
environmental risk , which set this class of problems off from others , make 
problems of environmental risk less amenable to institutional control . This 
section will discuss some of the problems encountered by existing institu­
tions in the management of environmental risk and will propose alternatives 
designed to alleviate these problems . 
3 5 .  In the SST debate there is both the env ironmental risk of ozone depletion and the 
classical pollution problem of sideline noise . In  the Department of Transportation 's  Environ­
mental Impact Statement and in the Environmental Defense Fund 's  opposition to the SST, the 
issue of sideline noise has been far more prominent than that of ozone depletion .  See generally 
Comment , Much to do About Concorde , 6 ENVT ' L  L. REP . 1 0072 ( 1 976) . John Hell igers of the 
Environmental Defense Fund attributes this emphasis to the subjective, uncertain nature of the 
probability assessments of depletion. Interview with John Hell igers ( 1977) .  
36.  Interview with Dr .  Farley Fisher ( 1 976) . 
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B. Worst Cases 
"Worst cases" are constructs useful in assessing the magnitude of risks 
associated with environmental risk problems . At its best , a worst case would 
provide a boundary beyond which there is a known zero probability of 
additional damage or cost . However , such a worst case could be defined 
only upon secure knowledge of the underlying mechanism . The uncertainty 
of mechanism associated with environmental risk necessitates the substitu­
tion of an ill-defined "credible " worst case for a well-defined worst case . 
Constructing worst cases useful for policy and management purposes is an 
art as yet not well developed . To date , there has been little discussion of 
techniques for constructing worst cases and little explicit methodology for 
their critique . 
One of the few areas in environmental risk in which systematic efforts 
have been made to construct and analyze worst cases is nuclear energy . In a 
three million dollar , seventy man-year effort , the Rasmussen Report37 
meticulously estimated the probabilities for the sequences of events leading 
to a nuclear reactor core meltdown and subsequent release of radiation . The 
report attempted to include every possible " credible" sequence . However , 
just as the final report was released, estimating the aggregate risk for a 
fatality from nuclear accident to be 5 x 1 0- 1 1  per reactor year , 38 a fire at the 
Brown' s  Ferry reactor nearly caused a core meltdown which could have 
caused thousands of fatalities . 39 Apparently , neither the sequence of design 
and human errors leading toward the meltdown nor the remedial action 
preventing the meltdown were modeled in the report . While the Rasmussen 
Report represents an enormous advance over previous efforts to define and 
estimate the likelihood of worst case accidents in nuclear power , there still is 
little information on which to base confidence in assessments of worst case 
risk for this application of nuclear technology . 
An alternative to defining a worst case or credible worst case is to 
define the " most probable" case and estimate its potential cost and likeli­
hood . However, this alternative may not always be possible . A twenty-one 
million dollar risk evaluation study by the Department of Transportation was 
not only unable to draw a clear boundary defining a credible worst case in 
the ozone depletion problem but also was unable to draw a conclusion as to 
the size and probability of the most probable case . 40 In the area of toxic 
37 . U . S . NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMI SSION , REACTOR SAFETY STU DY : AN ASSESSMENT 
OF ACCIDENT RISKS IN U . S .  COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS , WASH- 1 400 ( 1975) (called
the Rasmussen Report , after the director of the study ,  Norman C .  Rasmussen). 
38 .  Id. , Executive Summary , at 3 [hereinafter cited as Executive Summary] .  
39. See notes 53-54 infra and accompanying text.
40 . See u .S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION , CLIMATIC IMPACT ASSESSMENT PROGRAM ( 1 975) 
(series of six monographs ,  available from National Technical Information Service, Springfield,  
Va.) .  
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chemicals ,  efforts to design a worst case in order to assess risk have been on 
a smaller scale , but with even less success .4 1  
Difficulties in defining limits to the potential damage from environ­
mental risks have led to a series of retreats from absolute worst cases to 
credible worst cases to probable cases . While these retreats are understand­
able,  better management of environmental risks depends heavily upon the 
development of a methodology for constructing worst case scenarios . 
C. Presumed Low Probabilities 
The characteristics of modest benefits and potential catastrophe are 
incentives toward cautionary action . Yet , despite the potential result s ,  the 
incentive to gamble often stems from the low subjective probability of the 
catastrophic effect . 42 Although the characteristic of low probability makes 
environmental risk gambles more acceptable ,  this characteristic leads to 
several difficulties in the management of environmental risk . 
1 .  Subjective Versus Objective Probability 
In considering the probabilities of potential catastrophes associated 
with environmental risks , comparisons sometimes are made with natural 
disasters . For example , the Rasmussen Report ' s  estimate of the probability 
of fatality from one hundred nuclear power plants , one in five billion per 
year , was compared with the probability of fatality from meteorites ,  which 
was also estimated to be about one in five billion.  43 This comparison was 
used to suggest that the risks are roughly equivalent and that people should 
be as willing to live with one environmental risk as the other . 
However,  this comparison hides an important difference . The probabil­
ity of a large meteorite striking the earth can be computed from an historical 
record going back millions of years . There is a solid actuarial basis for the 
probability estimate . Hence , a high degree of confidence is associated with 
4 1 .  For example , data from In  re Shell Chemical Co. , 6 ERC 2047 (EPA, FIFRA Docket, 
1 974) , which suspended the registration of dieldrin ,  can be used to i l lustrate the problems of 
constructing a worst case for toxic chemicals .  Tests on mice indicated that at dose levels of 0. 1 
ppm there was an increase in benign and malignant l iver tumors which had a tendency to spread 
to other parts of the body and especially to the lungs . 6 ERC at 2053 .  Furthermore , concentra­
tions of dieldrin in the adipose tissue of the general .human population have been found to be 
comparable to the levels exposed to 0. 1 ppm of the compound . Id. at 2056. To construct a worst
case , can it be inferred from the similarity i n  body burdens of dieldrin in  the test mice and 
humans that dieldrin will eventually result i n  a s imi lar increase in the total overall cancer rate or 
just in  the l iver cancer rate? Can we infer some other rate of increase? On the one hand the
part icular strain of mice used appears sensit ive to liver cancer. On the other hand , a carcinogen 
affecting one site i n  a test animal can affect other sites in  humans . Moreover, humans are 
sometimes more sensit ive to carcinogens than laboratory animals .  There is little to go on since 
even the l ink between feeding concentration and body burden i s  uncertain .  
42. The asymmetry between internal benefits and external costs  i s  another incentive to
gamble , for the private decision maker and sometimes for the governmental decision maker as 
well . 
43 .  Executive Summary, supra note 38,  at 2-3 .  
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the estimate for the probability of a meteorite fatality . The case of nuclear 
power is vastly different . Estimators of the probability of a nuclear power 
plant fatality are dealing with barely a thirty year record , with human 
design , and with human error ; there is practically no actuarial basis for the 
probability estimate . The actual probability could be much higher or much 
lower . Dealing with probabilities which are uncertain is very different from 
dealing with probabilities which are known more precisely .  44 
Treating ignorance of mechanism as though it were randomness in a 
well-understood chance mechanism leads to thinking that probability esti­
mates are more precise than they really are . The low degree of confidence 
characteristic of probability estimates for environmental risks makes man­
agement of these problems difficul t ,  but this fundamental difficulty is better 
faced than conveniently forgotten .  45 
2. Bias in the Subjective Assessment of Low Probabilities
Due to uncertainty of mechanism, assessment of the probability of an
adverse effect for environmental risk is unlike assessment of the probability 
that a five will turn up when a die is rolled . In the latter case , the mechanism 
is exposed and the probability of 1 16 can be derived from the symmetry of 
the die ' s  six-sided figure . An alternate method for deriving this probability 
is the frequency of the five in repeated trial s .  Environmental risk presents a 
different problem; not only is the mechanism complicated and hidden , but 
there is only one " trial . " Either the catastrophic hypothesis holds or it does 
not . 46  The important issue is: How will people respond in assessing prob­
abilities when there is only a single trial for each gamble , there is no obvious 
symmetric chance mechanism from which to reason, and the adverse event 
is unlikely to occur ? 
Experiments by Alpert and Raiffa and by Tversky and Kahneman offer 
44. In an alternate usage , the term "risk" is reserved for situations where the underly ing
probabilities can be precisely estimated ,  as in games of chance ; "uncertainty" i s  then reserved 
for situations where the probabi l it ies can only be assessed imprecisely .  See F. KNIGHT, R I S K ,  
UNCERTAINTY , AND PROFIT 1 9-20, 1 97-232 ( 1 92 1 ) .  To avoid confusion, th i s  usage is  avoided in  
th is  Article .  
45 . Moreover, by treating ignorance of mechanism as though it were the same thing as 
randomness in a well understood mechanism,  one may miss important clues which may reduce 
the uncertainty of mechanism.  The path of tornadoes and the fall of meteorites are considered 
largely chance phenomena . The aerodynamics of the former and the celestial mechanics of the 
latter are thought to be understood about as well as they might be. To have approached the 
problem of earthquakes in the same spirit would have been a mistake . The prediction of 
earthquakes has made great gains in the past few years , because the research has focused on 
our ignorance of the underlying deterministic aspects of mechanism.  Treating ignorance of 
mechanism as though it were the same as a well understood chance mechanism can easily 
deflect us from gathering highly useful information for env ironmental risk management. Such 
treatment leads to different kinds of experiments and different approaches to resolving or l iv ing 
with uncertainty .  
4 6 .  See  note 2 supra and accompanying text. 
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an insightful approach to these questions . 47 Their results suggest that people 
often underestimate the probability of rare events .  The investigators began 
with a list of " almanac" questions such as : " How many foreign cars were 
imported into the United States in 1 968 ? "  For each question , the test 
subjects were asked to make an estimate so high that they would believe 
there was only a one percent probability that the true answer would exceed 
their estimate . They were also asked to make an estimate so low that they 
would feel there was only a one percent probability that the true answer 
would be lower than their estimate . If this construction of rare events were 
accurate and unbiased , the factual answers would lie outside these high and 
low estimates (confidence intervals) about two percent of the time . How­
ever, in the experiments the factual answers were outside the confidence 
intervals forty to fifty percent of the time . Constructing rare events to a 
given probability is not the same as assigning probabilities to rare events ; 
nevertheless ,  these experiments suggest that people may systematically 
assign insufficiently low probabilities to rare events .  
If people assign insufficiently low probabilities to rare events ,  the 
subjective probability assigned to the potential catastrophic result associated 
with an environmental risk may be too low . This problem could lead to 
many catastrophic surprises in environmental risk management . Further 
research is needed along these lines in order to understand the bias in 
subjective assessment of low probabilities . 
3. Rarity of Effect and Predictive Power
The assessment of the probability of a potential environmental catas­
trophe is a sequential process . An initial assessment is based on a limited 
understanding of mechanism. As new information is gathered, the initial 
assessments of probability are modified . Tribe discusses the difficulties 
encountered in using new information to modify initial probability assess­
ments of guilt in the context of criminal trials . 48 He argues persuasively that 
people tend to leave out important , often overriding factors because of the 
particular institutional goals and constraints of a trial setting . 
What happens to environmental risk where the initial assessment of 
"guilt" for some chemical may be considerably less than 0 . 1 ?  There is  
strong experimental evidence that at  the low end of the spectrum people 
overestimate the impact of new evidence . 49 The degree of rarity , or low 
47 . These experiments are described in Slovic, Kunreuther & White , Decision Processes, 
Rationality, and Adjustment to Natural Hazards , in NATURAL H AZARDS : LOCAL, NATIONAL 
AND GLOBAL 1 87 (G . White ed. 1 974). 
48 . Tribe , Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process , 84 H ARV . L .  
REV . 1 329 ( 1 97 1 ) .  
49 . Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases , 1 83 
SCIENCE 1 1 24 ,  1 1 25 ( 1 974) . 
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probabil ity, of environmental effect dilutes the predictive power of testing 
and of new information in a manner often unrecognized . 
For illustration of this last point, suppose that 60 of 1 0,060 chemicals 
are highly carcinogenic to humans and that a test has been developed which 
in the following sense is highly reliable . The test scores positive for carcino­
genic chemicals ninety-five percent of the time and scores negative for 
noncarcinogens ninety-four percent of the time . A chemical, drawn from the 
1 0,060, tests positive . What is the probability that the chemical is carcino­
genic ? Many people are surprised to learn that the actual probability, which 
can easily be derived from Bayes Theorem, is only 0 .09 .50 As suggested by 
Kahneman' s  research,5 1  people often expect too much in the way of proof 
from present tests and research techniques in problems of environmental 
risk . 
An unfortunate generalization arises directly from the underlying math­
ematics of this example : as the probability of an environmental effect 
approaches zero, the probability of a positive test being falsely positive 
approaches one . In other words, as an environmental risk problem takes on 
more of the characteristics of a zero-infinity dilemma, the probability of 
a false positive becomes higher . Simultaneously, the management problem 
becomes tougher because the more an environmental risk problem exhibits 
the zero-infinity characteristic, the greater is  the need to prevent a false 
negative-in this instance, the label ing of a guilty chemical as innocent . 
4. Human Error
Human error plays an especially important role in the assessment of
probabilities for environmental risks . The most l ikely cause of the poly­
brominated biphenyl (PBB) tragedy in Michigan was human error . It ap-
50. The reason for the 0 .09 probabil ity can be seen as follows . The test is  described by its 
two characteristics :  its abi l ity to classify truly carcinogenic chemicals as carcinogens (it does 
this with probabil ity 0.95) ,  and its ability to classify truly noncarcinogenic chemicals as noncar­
c inogenic (it does this with probability 0.94). Consider the second test characteristic first. If the 
test were applied to the entire group of 1 0 ,000 noncarcinogens ,  roughly  94% or 9400 chemicals 
would test negative (there would be some variation about this mean or expected value) . These 
are true negatives .  The remaining number, about 600 or 6% of the 10 ,000 noncarcinogens would
test positive . These are false posit ives .  Next consider the first test characterist ic .  If the test 
were applied to the much smaller group of 60 noncarcinogens ,  roughly 95% or 57 would test
positive.  These are true positives. Unfortunately ,  when a .positive test is  observed in  actual 
practice there is no way of knowing which group the chemical is  drawn from-the group 
of roughly  600 false posit ives or the smaller group of roughly  57 true posit ive s :  al l  that is known
is  that the chemical i s  drawn from the combined pool of about 657 positives . The probability 
that a chemical which tests positive is  in fact a carcinogen is only 57 chances out of 657 chances ,  
or  0 .09 .  The rarity of  effect tends to swamp the  discriminative power of  the  test . 
For a derivation of Bayes Theorem and discussion of an almost identical example involving 
carcinogenesis,  see E. PARZEN , MODERN PROBABILITY THEORY AND ITS APPLICATIONS 1 1 9-2 1 
( 1 960) . For more discussion of the use of Bayes Theorem in decision theory, see H .  RAI FFA, 
DECISION ANALYS I S :  INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON CHOICE UNDER UNCERTAINTY ( 1 970) . 
5 1 .  See Tversky & Kahneman , supra note 49, at 1 1 25 .
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pears that several bags of "Firemaster" (PBB) were mistakenly mixed into 
"Nutrimaster" (a cattle feed supplement consisting of magnesium oxide) in 
part because Michigan Chemical Company, the producer of both chemicals, 
had run out of marked bags .52 Similarly, the Brown ' s  Ferry fire, which 
nearly caused a reactor core meltdown,53 was started by operators using a 
candle to check for an air leak . 54 In retrospect, it is clear that the design 
which made the wires to the main operating system and the emergency 
system vulnerable to the same fire was also a human error . 
Large and complicated systems often are associated with environmen­
tal risks . .  Jn such systems, the chances for human error are multiplied 
enormously . A fundamental and very difficult question for environmental 
risk management is how to model and control human error effectively . 
D. Acceptable Risk 
Even if the probability of an environmental risk were well defined, our 
legal, regulatory, and economic institutions must still decide what degree of 
risk is acceptable .  Although there are several approaches for defining 
acceptable risk, there is l itt le agreement on what is the best approach . This 
ambiguity presents a major difficulty in managing environmental risk . A 
few of the approaches are discussed below . 
I .  Inferences from Behavior 
Acceptable risk is sometimes defined in terms of risks that people are 
observed to accept . Starr suggests that there are natural boundaries to risk, 
delineated by the high risk of communicable disease mortality and the low 
risk of natural disaster mortality, between which people accept exposure to 
52.  Carter, supra note 24, at 240. 
53 .  Henry Kendal l ,  Professor of Physics,  Massachusetts Institute of Technology , inter­
viewed in ' ' Incident at Brown's Ferry , "  NOVA #406, Feb. 23 ,  1 977,  transcript al 12 (television 
program , WGBH-TV , Boston,  Mass . ) .  
54 .  The Power of a Candle . 20  NUCLEAR ENGINEERING INT ' L  39 1  ( 1 975) .  The incident i s  
more thoroughly described in  Rippon , Brown 's Ferry Fire, 20 NUCLEAR ENGINEERING INT'L 46 1 
( 1 975) .  The fire started by the candle spread into control and instrumentation wiring, leading to 
the loss of several emergency cooli ng systems and , after one reactor was shut down, to 
increased temperatures and pressures which could not be controlled with some other backup 
systems.  The fire forced manual shutdown of both reactors at the Brown's Ferry site , and 
although other backup cool ing systems remained operational , all relied on manual controls .  The 
industry response to the accident stressed the fact that no catastrophe actually  had occurred : 
[More stringent requirements for separation of emergency features systems] would 
seem to answer any criticism that there might be of nuclear instal lations , but it could 
involve a formidable amount of backfitting if applied to all operating power stations.  
Bearing in mind that the Brown's  Ferry reactors were shut down and maintained in  a 
cooled state without any harm to personnel or equipment,  and that there were stil l 
alternative systems available to maintain the reactors in  a safe state , it would be wrong 
to react over hastily in the enforcement of the new control separation criteria in 
existing plants .  
ld. at 46 1 .  
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involuntary risk . 55 Such benchmark comparisons have been used in studies 
of nuclear power and appear to be a common approach taken by engineers . 5Ji 
Economists have suggested that premiums for hazardous occupations define 
acceptable risk .  57 However , for risk markets , whether implicit or explicit , to 
work well enough to define acceptable risk , the nature of the risks must be 
understood and the acceptance must be voluntary . There is considerable 
doubt that these conditions are met in cases of environmental risk. 58 An 
alternative to market or field data on actual behavior or risk acceptance is 
psychometric experimentation , which asks people to evaluate risks in labo­
ratory settings . This approach, which might be expected to yield concepts of 
acceptable risk , instead has only cast further doubt on the ability of people to 
evaluate risks . 59 
Inferences from behavior often carry the faintly Panglossian assump­
tion that whatever is accepted is acceptable . The following three approaches 
rely less on inference from behavior and are , therefore , more prescriptive . 
2. Limiting False Positives
This approach , which is the most common approach for risks subject to
governmental regulation and court proceedings ,  starts with the assumption 
that there is no risk and requires that a hazard be proved beyond some 
standard . Under this approach, by definition, if the standard of proof is not 
met , then the risk is acceptable . The burden of proof is placed on those 
seeking precautionary action.  An example of this perspective is a comment 
by the Water Commissioner of Philadelphia:  "If future research proves a 
true link between water-borne organics and cancer in humans , Philadelphia 
will spend whatever is necessary to cope with the problem. '  ' 60  Initially , this 
5 5 .  See Starr, Rudman & Whipple ,  Philosophical Basis for Risk Analysis , I ANN . REV . 
ENERGY 629 , 629-30 ( 1 976) , critiqued in H .  Otway & J .  Cohen,  Revealed Preferences :
Comments on the  Starr Benefit-Risk Relationships (International Institute for  Applied Systems 
Analysis [Laxenburg , Austria] Research Memorandum ,  March , 1 975) . 
56. See, e.g. , Executive Summary, supra note 38 ,  at 1 .
57 . See R .  Thaler and S .  Rosen ,  The Value of Saving a Life : Evidence from the Labor 
Market (paper presented to National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Income and 
Wealth, Household Production and Consumption, Washington, D .C . ,  Nov . 30, 1 973) . 
58 . Cf. Lave , Product Safety: An Economic View ,  ASTM STANDARDIZATION NEWS , Feb. 
1 963 , at 1 4-2 1 (stating that product safety regulations may fail to determine acceptable risk). See 
generally the discussion of drugs and food additives and occupational hazards in the section on 
typology of related problems at text accompanying notes 1 1 - 1 2  supra . 
59. See, e . g. , Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 49. See also Slovic, Kunreuther & 
White , supra note 47 , at 1 9 1 -99. Robert Kates reports on studies in which less than half the 
public could translate the National Weather Service ' s  probability of precipitation into qualita­
tive rankings of more and less likely . See R. Kates,  supra note 1 6 ,  at 3 1 -35. 
60. Letter from Carmen Guarino, Water Commissioner, City of Philadelphia, to the
editor of the American City Magazine (Mar . 7 ,  1 975) . Eric Johnson, head of the American
Water Works Association , also advocated the approach l imiting false positives :  " U ntil it 
[chloroform in drinking water] is proved to be bad , I'd prefer to believe it isn't .  Municipalities 
have plenty of things to spend their money on . "  Hornblower , EPA Plans Rules on Water 
Purity , Los Angeles Times ,  Dec . 27 , 1 977, pt . l ,  at 1 ,  15,  col .  1 (quoting Johnson) . 
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perspective appears reasonable , especially in view of the sweeping remedial 
action premised upon meeting the standard of proof . This approach also 
suggests caution, in that open-ended expenditures for control will not be 
spent unnecessarily . 61 However , the approach of limiting false positives ,  
although often effective in defining acceptable risk for classical problems , 
has questionable value for the management of environmental risk . 
Limiting false positives is common in statistical studies , including 
studies of environmental risks .  The tested hypothesis is usually a hypothesis 
of no effect . A statistical procedure is chosen which limits the chance of a 
false positive , the erroneous rejection of the no-effect or null hypothesis and 
the concomitant finding of an effect , to some prescribed level , usually one or 
five percent in practice . If the null hypothesis is rejected, a decision is made 
that there is an effect ; if the procedure fails to reject , there is no decision as 
to the existence or nonexistence of the effect (" judgment is reserved" ) .  In 
common practice , however, after a failure to reject a no-effect hypothesis ,  
and perhaps during the time further investigations are undertaken,  decision 
makers treat the effect as though it were nonexistent and take few 
precautionary steps .  Moreover , sometimes the distinction between the fail­
ure to find an effect and the finding of no effect is simply ignored. In that 
case , a negative finding leads to a negative conclusion.62 
The distinction between the failure to find an effect and the conclusion 
that there is no effect is not trivial . This distinction is  so important , 
especially in the area of environmental risk management , that its blurring 
can be given the name fallacy of false negative . The fallacy is to believe that 
a decision procedure designed to limit false positives necessarily yields any 
conclusion about the nonexistence of an effect when there is a negative 
finding . 
A simple illustration is helpful . A pail contains tennis balls , all white 
except for the possibility of a single yellow ball .  The problem is to deter­
mine whether the pail contains the yellow ball . In the decision procedure an 
observer is allowed to look only at the top layer . Under the procedure the 
6 1 .  See note 74 infra for the different evaluation following from the expected value 
approach .  
62 .  One of the  important studies of carcinogens in drinking water provides an example of  
a negative conclusion being drawn from a negative finding. In h is  first study of carcinogens in 
Ohio drinking water ,  Buncher found some statistically significant results but enough insignifi­
cant results so that he concluded that he could not reject the no-effect hypothesis .  C. Ralph 
Buncher, Cincinnati Drinking Water-An Epidemiologic Study of Cancer Rates ( 1 975). In 
transmitt ing the study to the Cincinnati City Council , the City's Health Commissioner 
concluded , from the inability of the statistical procedure to find an effect,  that there was no 
effect.  He wrote : "It was concluded that these two events [the high cancer rates in Cincinnati 
and what he termed 'minute ' quantities of organic compounds in the drinking water] were 
unrelated . "  Letter of transmission from Arnold Leff to City Council of Cincinnati (Nov . 1 4 ,  
1 975) . This inference , unjustified in stat istical theory , became a n  embarrassment after Bun­
cher ' s  second study , which , using a larger data base , rejected the no-effect hypothesis and 
found an effect . Buncher, Drinking Water as an Epidemiological Risk Factor in Ohio , in  4 
COLD SPRING HARBOR CONFERENCES ON CELL PROLI FERATION , ORIGINS OF HUMAN CANCER 
( 1 977) .  
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test scores positive if the observer sees a yellow ball in the top layer ; the test 
scores negative if the observer does not see a yellow ball in the top layer . In 
this simple procedure the probability of a false positive is limited to zero . If 
there is no yellow ball in the pail , the observer will not see one in the top 
layer ;  there is no way for the test erroneously to find an effect when it does 
not exist . However , the probability of a false negative , a conclusion that the 
ball i s  not present when it actually i s ,  can vary all the way from zero to one , 
from never to always ,  depending on the number of layers of balls . 
If the pail is only one layer deep , the probability of a false negative is 
zero . In this situation, if the observer does not see the yellow ball , it is not in 
the pail . In this extreme case , there is no distinction between the failure to 
see the yellow ball and the finding that there is no yellow ball in the pail . 
However, if the pail is several layers deep, the distinction becomes im­
portant . There exists the possibility of not seeing the yellow ball even 
though it is present . If the pail i s  several hundred layers deep , the chance of 
a false negative , not seeing the ball even though it  i s  in the pai l ,  is nearly 
I 00 percent .  
Thus ,  as the depth of the pail is varied from a single to an infinite 
number of layers , the probability of a false negative varies from zero to one , 
even though the chance of a false positive is always held to the same limi t ,  
zero . As can be seen by this illustration,  l imiting the chance of  a false 
positive does not by itself yield any conclusion regarding the chance of an 
effect not being present upon a negative finding . 
This does not mean that decision makers can never draw negative 
conclusions from negative findings . However,  in order to do so the structure 
of the problem must be investigated directly . The less uncertain the structure 
( i . e. , the more information available) , the more likely it is that a negative 
finding will foad to a valid conclusion . In the illustration , the important 
structure is the depth of the pail or the ratio of the balls that can be seen to 
those that cannot . If the observer is allowed to see nine-tenths of the balls 
and still does not see the yellow ball , he can conclude , with only a ten 
percent chance of a false negative , that the yellow ball i s  not present . Thus ,  
a negative conclusion has been established from a negative finding . 
In many decision problems the pail may be shallow , so a negative 
finding will impart a good deal of information about the nonexistence of 
effect. But in environmental risk , with long latencies and diffusion of 
effects ,  effects are well hidden.  For these risks , the pail is deep and careful 
investigation is required to support a negative conclusion drawn from a 
negative finding . In one model of carcinogens in drinking water ,  where the 
chance of a false positive was held to 5 percent , the chance of a substantial 
effect going undetected was still 40 percent .63 
63 . Harris ,  Page & Reiches ,  Carcinogenic Hazards of Organic Chemicals in Drinking 
Water, in id. The model is developed as a simple i l lustrat ion of the problems of stat istical 
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The attuned reader will find the fallacy of  the false negative ubiqu itous 
in legal , regulatory , and statistical reasoning . When the press reports that 
saccharin has been in use for 70 years without a single human cancer death 
proven as a result of its use , the suggested inference is that this is ev idence 
of saccharin ' s  non-carcinogenicity to humans .  Before drawing this infer­
ence , regulatory institutions and other decision makers should investigate 
the likelihood of detecting saccharin carcinogenity even if, for example , it 
should contribute 700 to 1 ,000 extra cancer deaths a year . This type of 
question is rarely posed or investigated in statistical and other studies of 
environmental risks .64 Without its investigation , negative findings are 
largely devoid of meaning , especially for environmental risks where the 
probabilities of false negatives are likely to be substantial . For a meaningful 
interpretation of a negative finding , there must first be an explicit investiga­
tion of the power of the statistical or other decision procedure to detect 
hidden effects .  65 
3. Limiting False Negatives 
Limiting false positives is the guiding principle of criminal law . The 
objective is to limit the chance of a false conviction .  The common-sense 
justification for this objective is that it is better to free a hundred guilty men 
than to convict one innocent man . A rough translation is  that a false positive 
(false conviction) is a mistake a hundred times more costly than a false 
negative (false acquittal) . A principal reason for this is that liberty is a 
primary good , i. e. , a good for the deprivation of which there is no adequate 
compensation .66 The asymmetrical results achieved by the criminal justice 
system are intentional and follow from the exceptional value placed on 
l iberty . 
A comparison of criminal law with environmental risk , however,  
suggests an important difference . The costs of false negatives and false 
positives are asymmetric for environmental ri�k as wel l ,  but the asymmetry
is in reverse order . For environmental risk , the asymmetrically high cost 
arises from a false negative ; in criminal law from a false positive . S imilarly,  
power when effects are hidden ,  in  the  sense that they  are rare and relatively small compared 
with background. In statistics, "power" is the probabil ity that a test will find an effect if it 
exists .  It i s  one minus the probabil ity of a false negative . 
64. Marvin Schneiderman , Associate Director,  Field Studies and Statistics Institute,
National Cancer Institute , has emphasized the need for investigat ion of statistical power .  Letter 
from Marvin Scheiderman to Dr. Ph i l ippe Shubik, Director , Eppley I nst itute for Research in 
Cancer, University of Nebraska (June 28,  1 976) , commenting on P.  Shubik,  General Criteria for 
· Assessing the Evidence for Carcinogenicity of Chemical Substances (unpublished memoran­
dum).  The concept of "st�tistical power" is  defined in note 63 supra . 
65 . In the case of Cincinnati drinking water, Buncher specifical ly warned against the 
fallacy of the false negative , although he did not investigate the probability of a false negative . 
See Buncher, supra note 62 , at 1 1 4- 1 5 .  
66. See generally J .  RAWLS , A TH EORY O F  J U STICE 6 1 -65 ( 1 97 1 ) .  Rawls defines a primary 
good as a good "that every rational man is presumed to want . "  Id. at 62. 
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just as a primary good , liberty , is an important concern in criminal law , so 
another primary good , health , is an important concern in environmental risk 
management , but again the roles are reversed . Typically , public health is 
adversely affected under a false negative for environmental risk , while 
l iberty is adversely affected under a false positive for criminal law . 
The analogy between criminal law and environmental risk requires that 
the roles of negatives and positives be reversed. If the emphasis on limiting 
false positives for criminal law is sensible and based on the asymmetry of 
costs of wrong decisions and the possible deprivation of a primary good, 
then the implication is that a decision procedure based upon limiting false 
negatives is more appropriate for environmental risk than one based upon 
l imiting false positives . 
A common justification for the usual approach to environmental risk, 
which focuses on limiting false positives ,  is that because it is impossible to 
prove absolute safety , the burden must shift to a proof of danger . This is a 
non sequitur in environmental risk because usually it is impossible to prove 
either safety or danger with finality . 
This does not suggest that acceptable risk should be defined solely in 
terms of limiting just one type of error . Nonetheless ,  since the previous 
focus of environmental risk management has been on limiting false posi­
tives ,  some redress toward limiting false negatives is now in order . Shifting 
burdens and standards of proof helps accomplish this goal . The Delaney 
Clause amenament is a conspicuous example of a procedure which osten­
sibly attempts to limit false negatives in the control of carcinogenic food 
additives .67 However , the amendment has eliminated only two minor addi­
tives in 19 years-MOCA and Flectol II-so there is considerable question 
whether it provides substantial protection against false negatives . 68 
Focusing more attention on the need to limit false negatives brings us 
back to the importance of modeling the risks and hypotheses ,  including 
"credible" worst case modeling . It is clearly infeasible to take precaution­
ary action for each conceivable environmental risk ; there would be too 
many . Requiring some sort of model of the risk provides an entrance barrier 
against the flood of conceivable risks for which precautionary action should 
be evaluated . Because of the nature of environmental risk it is senseless to 
require actual proof of harm; the barrier should be no more than a reasonable 
67 . 21 U . S . C .  § 348(c)(3)(A) ( 1 970) (the Delaney Clause) .  See generally Blank, The 
Delaney Clause: Technical Naivete and Scientific Advocacy in the Formulation of Public Health 
Policies , 62 CALIF.  L. REV . 1 084 ( 1 974) ; Oser , An Assessment of the Delaney Clause After 15 
Years , 29 FOOD DRUG CosM . L.J .  201 ( 1 974) . The Delaney Clause states :  
n o  additive shall b e  deemed t o  b e  safe i f  it  i s  found t o  induce cancer when ingested by 
man or animal , or if it is found , after tests which are appropriate for the evaluation of 
the safety of food additives, to induce cancer in  man or animal . . . . 
2 1  U . S .C . § 348(c)(3)(A) ( 1 970) . 
68 . M .  Suter & W. Muir, Survey of Toxic Substance Regulation of the U . S .  Federal 
Government 93 ( 1 977) (draft) . 
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basis within the context of the model for believing that there is a risk of
harm. The risk itself may be small . 
For many environmental risks it is difficult even to define a candidate 
which might be or might become a false negative , much less to design an
institutional structure which would take the chance of a false negative into
account as well as the chance of a false positive . The search for environmen­
tal risk candidates and false negatives remains an underdeveloped art , and
each case is different . The following example illustrates the art and devel­
opment of a reasonable basis for concluding that there is an environmental
risk , in this case within the context of a model of chemical carcinogenesis.
In the 1 972-74 period , Robert Harris identified carcinogens in drinking
water as a major environmental risk . There were several clues , some
positive and some negative .69
Among the positive clues were : 
(i) The original determination of safety was made under one set of
circumstances ,  but when the circumstances changed, the determination of 
safety was maintained with little or no re-examination . At the turn of the 
century , infectious disease �as a problem and the purification system of the
time was designed to filter and kill bacteria. The acute nature of this
problem facilitated rapid testing . The resulting corrective system, however , 
was not designed to trap and eliminate heavy metals and industrial organic
chemical s ,  which were in low concentrations at the time and not perceived
as a problem .  When heavy metals and industrial organics grew enormously
in concentration , little was done to inquire whether the old standard of safety
still applied . 
(ii) Several chemicals found in drinking water are known carcino­
gens . 70 Evidence of the presence of carcinogens was available ten to twenty
years ago . Thus ,  the question is not whether there are carcinogens in
drinking water , but whether the carcinogens in drinking water are in suffi­
ciently high concentrations to have an impact on cancer rates . 
(iii) Scientists have known for at least a decade that cancer rates are 
elevated along industrialized rivers such as the Mississippi . 
69. R. Harris ,  supra note 1 7 .  See also Harris & Brecher,  Is the Water Safe to Drink ? ,  3
9 
CONSUMER REP.  436, 538 ,  623 ( 1 974) (three part series) .
70. In  1 972 , EPA released a study of the lower Mississippi River whi
ch identified in the 
raw or treated drinking water, mercury , arsenic , lead , copper ,  chromi
um,  cadmium, zinc , 
phenols , and cyanides ,  among others .  Three compounds in the treated d
rinking water were 
identified as carcinogens-<:hloroform, benzene , and carbon tetrachlorid
e--and hexachlo­
robenzene ,  zylene , ethyl benzene , and dimethylsulfoxide were suspect
ed carcinogens at the 
time . Region VI, U . S .  Environmental Protection Agency ,  Industrial Pol
lution of the Lower 
Mississippi River in Louisiana (Apr. 1 972). See R. Harris ,  supra note 1 7 ,  at 6
.  For earlier work, 
see Middleton & Rosen, Organk Contaminants Affecting the Quality of Water, 71 Pu
s . 
HEALTH REP. 1 1 25 ( 1 956) ; W. HUEPER & W. CONWAY , C HEMICAL CARCINOGEN ESIS 
AND 
CANCERS 659-60 ( 1 964) . 
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(iv) As long ago as 1 963 , Hueper and Payne showed that extracts of
industrialized river water caused cancer in mice . 7 1
There were also some negative clues : 
(i) There are many chemicals in drinking water .  If a number of these
chemicals are harmful , they are likely to have different effects (cancer, birth
defects , liver toxicity , etc . ). In the aggregate , the effects will tend to diffuse
and mask each other. Many different effects are harder to disentangle than
one large one . Furthermore , long latencies are usually associated with
waterborne carcinogens , because they are ingested in low concentrations
over long periods of time . During these long periods of time , people move , 
drink from different sources of water , and die of other causes .  Moreover , 
the contaminants in a given water supply change . In other words , there were
strong reasons to believe that if the effects existed , they would not have
come to light on their own . 
(ii) In the past decade , exposure to industrial organic chemicals has
greatly increased . Much of the effect could be in the future and thus further
hidden from present view . 
A survey of the process of identification of environmental risks is not
comforting . It appears that the process is often haphazard , not only in the
case of carcinogens in drinking water,  where the identification occurred
outside formal institutions designed to safeguard water , but also in other
cases,  such as the identification of PBB s ,  Thalidomide , and Tris as environ­
mental risk candidates .  72 Because of the lack of systematic , effective proce­
dures for identifying potential false negatives ,  legal and regulatory agencies
have not recognized, much less controlled, many environmental risk
hazards . 
4. Balancing False Positives and False Negatives
An approach toward a definition of acceptable risk and the design of 
legal and regulatory institutions in managing environmental risk need not be 
restricted to choosing between limiting either false positives or false nega­
tives . Instead , it can seek to weigh the risk of one wrong decision against 
another.  The most frequently proposed means to accomplish this is to make 
the decision to regulate or not to regulate an environmental risk by compar-
7 1 .  Hueper & Payne, Carcinogenic Effects of Adsorbates of Raw and Finished Water Supplies , 39 A M .  J. CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 475 ( 1 963) .  
72 . The role of PPBs was identified by accident after a chromatograph was inadvertantly left on during lunch. See Carter, supra note 24, at 241 . Thalidomide was identified some time after two deformed infants were exhibited at the annual meeting of pediatricians in  Kasse l ,Germany in 1 960. See Taussig, The Thalidomide Syndrome, SCIENTIFIC A MERICAN , August 1962 , at 29. Attention turned to Tris several years after massive exposure , when Mike Prival and Farley Fisher of the Office of Toxic Substance s ,  EPA , asked what tests had been done on the chemicals in  children's  pajamas . At that time the Office of Toxic Substances had no jurisdiction over the chemical . Interview with Mike Prival ( 1 976) . 
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ing the cost of a false negative weighted by its probability with the cost of a 
false positive weighted by its probability , and choosing the alternative with 
the lower weighted cost . This method of minimizing the expected cost of a 
wrong decision is simply another version of the expected value criterion. 73 
There will still be some risk of making a wrong decision , and this mixed 
approach offers its own definition of acceptable risk. Under this approach ,  
once a decision i s  chosen t o  minimize the expected cost o f  a wrong decision 
the remaining risk is acceptable . Application of this approach requires four 
pieces of information : the cost of a false negative ; the cost of a false 
positive ; and the probability of each . 
In its extreme , the approach of limiting false positives requires positive 
evidence of " dead bodies" before acting . Consideration focuses on the 
probability of a false positive . It does not matter that , as is typical with 
environmental risk , the cost of a false negative may be much higher than the 
cost of a false positive or even that the probability of a false negative may be 
substantially higher than the probability of a false positive . In the approach 
limiting false negatives consideration focuses on the probability of a false 
negative . Although the approach limiting false negatives is more suited to 
the characteristics of environmental risk than is the approach limiting false 
positives ,  expected vaiue minimization is a distinct improvement over either 
because expected value minimization takes into account four relevant fac­
tors instead of just one and it provides a balance between the two types of 
error . 74 
The cancer test in the previous illustration provides an example of the 
advantage of using expected value minimization . 75 From one point of view 
73. This can be seen by l ist ing the four possibil it ies :  ( I )  the environmental gamble is
rejected when the catastrophic hypothesis is true (true positive) , (2) the environmental gamble 
is accepted when the catastrophic hypothesis is true (false negative), (3) the environmental 
gamble is rejected when the benign hypothesis is  true (false posit ive), and (4) the environmental 
gamble is accepted when the benign hypothesis is  true (true negative) . Possibilities (2) and (3) 
are the wrong decis ions . If the environmental gamble is accepted ,  there is  the risk of (2) with 
cost (C - B)-the costs are somewhat offset in the " modest" benefits of the environmental risk 
which accrue even under the catastrophic hypothesis .  In terms of note 4 the probability of this
loss is  p and expected cost p(C - B) .  If the environmental gamble is rejected,  there is  risk of the 
wrong decis ion (3) with cost B, the benefits unnecessarily foregone , probability ( 1 -p) ,  and 
expected cost ( 1 - p)B . The expected cost rule , to minimize the expected cost of wrong 
decisions,  directs us  to accept the gamble if p(B - C) < ( l -p)B,  which is  the same condition as 
in note 4 supra . 
74. In the case of drinking water and carcinogens ,  with all four factors in considerat ion , 
the increase in cancer is the open-ended cost.  The increase might be as l itt le as zero , or 1 5  
percent , as preliminary regression analys is  has suggested , or with low probabil i ty , even h igher .  
See Page , Harris & Epste in ,  Drinking Water and Cancer Mortality in Louisiana , 1 93 SC I ENCE 
55 ( 1 976) . Matched against these high costs of cancer, engineering estimates of the cost of 
control , by carbon filtration , are bounded at lower levels with much greater confidence. 
The cost of precautionary water treatment is  an internal cost (internal to the municipal 
budget) ,  while the cost of cancer is an external cost (external to the municipal budget). 
Internal iz ing costs is  difficult for municipal i t ies ,  just as it is  for firms . 
75 .  This i l lustration is presented at text accompanying notes 49-5 1 supra . 
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the test created more , not less ,  uncertainty . 76 Before the test , the chance that 
the chemical chosen was noncarcinogenic was 99 . 5  percent ; after the test , it 
was 91 percent . However, there is clearly a gain in information from 
performing the test , a gain which may be decisive from an expected value 
standpoint . If the cost of a false negative is 1 2  times the cost of a false 
positive , then control is warranted under the expected value criterion . This 
is true even though the probability that the chemical is carcinogenic is only 9 
percent . In this illustration, and probably in many practical instances ,  the 
expected value criterion of acceptable risk is more conservative than are 
existing approaches ,  which focus on limiting false positives . It is important 
to note that when the expected value approach is used , the standard of proof 
is tailored to the magnitude of potential wrong decisions . 77 
The expected value approach does not require that each environmental 
risk be regulated , or not regulated , on the sole basis of a detailed and 
quantified cost-benefit analysis .  To do so would ignore several of the 
important characteristics of environmental risk . 78 Alternatively , in order to 
come closer to a minimum expected cost of wrong decisions ,  it is necessary 
to adjust the rules of the decision process-the standards and burdens of 
proof , the rules of liability , the incentives for the generation and validation 
76. In  this point of view, the closer a probability is  to zero or one the more certain we are
about the event taking place or not ; the closer the probability is  to 0.5 the more uncertain we are 
about the event taking place . 
77. This is essentially the approach adopted in the Toxic Substances Control Act , Pub .  L .
No.  94-469 , 90 Stat . 2003 , 1 5  U . S . C . A .  §§  260 1 -2629 (West Supp .  1 977) , the  purpose of  which  is
to control "unreasonable risks " of chemicals and chemical mixtures .  What is not an unreason­
able risk is an acceptable risk. See Slesin & Sandler, Categorization of Chemicals Under the
Toxic Substances Control A ct ,  7 ECOLOGY L.Q.  359, 365-7 1 ( 1 978) . Although "unreasonable 
risk" is  not defined in the Act, the House Report states :  
fn general , a determination that a risk associated with a chemical substance o r  mixture
is unreasonable involves balancing the probabil ity that harm will occur and the mag­
nitude and severity of that harm against the effect of proposed regulatory action on the 
availability to society of the benefits of the substances or mixture . . . . 
H . R .  REP. No. 94- 1 34 1 , 94th Cong . , 2d Sess .  14 ( 1 976) . John Hil ls and Phil l ip Spector discuss
and recommend steps toward an expected value approach.  See Hills,  Legal Decisions and 
Opinions in Pollution Cases , JO ENVT'L Sci .  & TEC H .  234, 238 ( 1 976) ; Spector, Regulation of 
Pesticides by the Environmental Protection Agency , 5 EcoLOGY L.Q.  233 , 260 ( 1 976) . 
The House Report • s  specification of unreasonable risk continues as follows :  
The balancing process described above does not require a formal benefit-cost 
analysis under which a monetary value is  assigned to the risks associated with a 
substance and to the cost to society of proposed regulatory action on the availability of 
such benefits .  Because a monetary value often cannot be assigned to a benefit or cost, 
such an analysis would not be very usefu l .  
ld. at  1 4 .
7 8 .  For example ,  the i nternal transfer o f  benefits tends t o  b e  associated with a sharply 
focused group of proponents of the environmental risk taking, while the external transfer of the 
potential costs ,  diffused both spatially  and temporal ly ,  i s  associated with a broader but less 
focused group of opponents.  Th is imbalance in interests,  for and against,  is  likely to lead to an 
imbalance in  decision making, even for an ostensibly neutral cost-benefit analys is ,  unless the 
imbalance in interests is recognized and offset by the design of the decision making institutions .  
See M .  OLSON , T H E  LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 23-52 ( 1 964) . 
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of information , and so on.  For instance , when the potential adverse effects 
of an environmental risk are many times greater than the potential benefits , a 
proper standard of proof of danger under the expected cost minimization 
criterion may be that there is only "at least a reasonable doubt " that the 
adverse effect will occur , rather than requiring a greater probabil ity , such as 
"more l ikely than not , "  that the effect will occur .  Simple rules of thumb 
embodied in legal and regulatory institutions may come closer to expected 
cost minimization than elaborate attempts at quantification . 79 
In an expected value sense , the resources and interests going into a 
decision process are properly balanced when the rules and incentives are 
adjusted to minimize the costs of wrong decisions in the long run . This 
expected value point of view , applied to environmental risk , means that 
false positives must be tolerated as the price of controlling false negatives .  80
79. In the absence of sufficient information to produce numerical estimates of the
potential costs , benefits , and probabil it ies ,  formal benefit-risk or decision analysis i s  stil l often 
recommended as a structure of the important elements which wil l  need to be balanced without 
full quantification. In  the implementation of the Flammable Fabrics  Act , 15 U . S . C .  § §  1 1 9 1 -
1 204 ( 1 970) , formal decision analysis was appl ied with the major purpose o f  making sure that no 
important aspects of the problem were neglected . Personal i nterview with Myron Tribus ,  
Senior Vice  President , Research and Engineering, Xerox Corporation · s  Information Technolo­
gy Group ( 1 976) . However, there is  no guarantee that decision analysis will not focus on what in 
hindsight are clearly the wrong aspects of the problem. In the case of Tris ,  the princ ipal tradeoff 
considered was the balance between i ncreased cost of the garment with i ncreased amounts of 
retardant and increased l ikel ihood that the flame retardant standard would be "subverted " by 
housewives making their own cheaper , nonretarded children's  sleepwear. Tribus ,  Decision 
Analysis Approach to Satisfying the Requirements of the Flammable Fabrics Act ,  ASTM 
STANDARDIZATION NEWS , Feb . ,  1 973 , at 22, 27 . At the t ime of implementation,  the Mrak 
Commission had just reported on s imilar chemicals ,  finding several of them carcinogenic . But 
there had been no investigation of toxicity , either acute or chronic, for Tris or the other 
chemicals proposed as retardants .  See U . S .  DEP'T OF HEALTH , EDUCATION , AND WELFARE , 
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY ' S  COMMISSION OF PESTICIDES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ENVIRON­
MENTAL HEALTH ( 1 969) . Five years later ,  the question of toxicity arose quite outside the 
original decision framework and implementation of the Flammable Fabrics  Act, which was 
administered first by the Department of Commerce and then by the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission , see note 72 supra . Through independent efforts it was learned that Tris kil ls 
goldfish at one part per mil l ion . After exposure to more than 40 mill ion people-Tris not only 
made up more than ten percent of the weight of many pyjamas , but also was used for 
mattresses , drapes ,  and so on-the National Cancer Institute found the chemical to be one of 
the most potent carcinogens ever tested .  For a single year 's  exposure to Tris ,  the National 
Cancer Institute estimate of excess cancer mortality is  1 5 ,000 ; Bruce Ames '  estimate is 
substantially higher. See N. Kim Hooper & Bruce Ames ,  Letter to U . S .  Consumer Product
Safety Commission, March 2 1 ,  1 977 ; Mintz, U. S. Bans Sleepwear Treated with Tris , The 
Washington Post, Apr. 8 ,  1 977, at A l ,  A4. The Consumer Product Safety Commission es­
timated that about 300 children from age zero to six would be fatally burned by their sleepwear 
in  the absence of retardants. I t  must also be asked whether children younger than a year (with 
presumably less than 50 fatal burns per year as they are less mobile than older chi ldren) should 
be exposed to other flame retardants ,  for which there is  evidence of latent hazard . Id. 
80. Paul Oreffice ,  President of Dow Chemical Company , criticized regulatory agencies
for seeking a "zero-risk" society . Washington [D. C . ]  Star, Jan. 28,  1 978, § C ,  at 6 .  Clearl y ,  zero 
risk is unobtainable .  While more conservative than the approach l imiting false posit ives,  the 
expected value approach only attempts to balance one risk against another. 
Under an expected value approach ,  given the asymmetries in potential cost, we should 
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5. Three Qualifications 
This Article has suggested that an approach of expected value can be
used to define.acceptable risk and that this approach is superior to e ither of
the one-sided approaches ,  limiting false positives or limiting false nega­
tives .  But the characteristics of environmental risk require that the expected
value approach be modified in three ways before it can yield a satisfactory
definition of acceptable risk . These qualifications are more easily stated than
implemented ; they will require careful thought and debate before they can
be built into decision processes in a satisfactory way . 
The first modification is necessary because of social risk aversion . 
Individuals will not accept actuarially fair gambles when potentially large
losses may result . 8 1  The characteristic of collective risk means that the
potential adverse consequences of environmental risk cannot be spread to
average out catastrophic costs , and consequently society itself is risk
averse . 82 Although a risk may be acceptable using only the expected value
approach, it may be unacceptable when social risk aversion is considered . 
This much is easily stated ; the hard part is to uncover a social consensus on
the appropriate amount of risk aversion and then to build this amount into
the institutions which manage environmental risks . 
A second modification is required as a consequence of irreversibility . 
The value and timing of information is related to the degree of irreversibili­
ty . If an environmental risk proves catastrophic , there is no choice for the 
future except to live with the irreversible consequence . However , if the 
decision is postponed , the choice remains open and deci sion makers can 
make use of subsequent information. Irreversible commitment in the present 
greatly reduces the value of information to be gained in the future . The 
greater the prospect of improved information, the more important it is  not to 
foreclose a choice irreversibly in the present . Conversely , the greater the 
irreversibil ity , the greater is the value of postponement . This dependence 
between the value of information and the timing of an irreversible commit-
accept perhaps several false positives for each false negative .  Although i t  may take years, if 
ever, before i t  is  known whether a risk classified and treated as a positive is  a false posit ive or a 
true posit ive,  it is possible to survey past alarms and nonalarms to see if later evaluation found 
them more or less severe than at their first appraisal . Edward Lawless ' pre l iminary work in \,his 
direction suggests that we may be accepting more false negatives than false positives ,  contrary 
to the expected value criterion .  See E. Lawless,  Technology and Social Shock (report for the 
National Science Foundation) .
8 1 .  An actuarial ly fa ir  gamble i s  one for which the expected value i s  zero.  Most people , 
for example ,  would refuse a coin fl ip where they could gain $ 1 00 ,000 with probabil i ty 0 . 5  but 
could lose $ 1 00,000 with the same probabil ity , s imply because they cannot afford the potential 
loss, even though this i s  an actuarially fair gamble . 
82. For collective ,  environmentally transferred r isk,  the assumptions of the Arrow-Lind 
theorem will not be met . See Fisher , Environmental Externalities and the A"ow-Und Public Investment Theorem , 63 A M .  ECON . R E V .  722 ( 1 973) .
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ment is often left out of conventional cost-benefit analyses .  Greater precau­
tion results from taking this dependence into account . 83 
The third modification is necessary due to latency and irreversibility . A 
conventional cost-benefit analysis based on expected cost minimization 
considers only the discounted sums of the costs associated with potentially 
wrong decisions .  The characteristics of latency and irreversibility result in a 
separation of the benefits , enjoyed in the present , from the potential costs , 
borne in the future . Due to this separation , those who bear the costs often are 
not those who enjoy the benefits . For this reason , the equity of the distribu­
tion of costs and benefits is a fundamental consideration for environmental 
risk . Since those who bear the potential costs may not be alive at the time a 
decision is made to accept an environmental risk , the problem of intertem­
poral equity is further compounded by the problem of representation in a 
current decision.  84 Thus,  the question of what is an intertemporally fair 
distribution of benefit and potential cost is especially difficult . Taking 
intertemporal equity into consideration yields a more precautionary treat­
ment of environmental risk than would be the case if only the discounted 
sums of potential costs and benefits were considered . 
Expected cost minimization and the three modifications appropriate to 
the special characteristics of environmental risk suggest a more precaution­
ary management of environmental risk, and a lower level of acceptable 
risk , than is frequently suggested . How much more conservative , and how 
this conservatism could be built into our regulatory , legal , and economic 
institutions , remains a difficult and unresolved problem . 
6. Reactive Versus Anticipatory Institutions 
Whether the appropriate institutional response to a problem should be 
reactive or anticipatory depends on the nature of the problem. For classical 
pollution , reactive institutions may be satisfactory and perhaps even desir­
able ; environmental risk requires anticipatory institutions . 
In a detailed case study of the Los Angeles smog problem, Krier and 
Ursin describe the following highly reactive mode of institutional re­
sponse . 85 In the thirty-five years since the smog problem emerged, control 
policy has been a policy of least steps , or least cost steps . As complaints 
rose in the early 1 940s , the easiest remedies were applied first ;  for exam-
83. See Fisher & Krutilla, Valuing Long Run Ecological Consequences and Irreversi­
bilities , l J. ENVT'L ECON . & MANAGEMENT 96 ( 1 974). See also Arrow & Fisher, Environmental 
Preservation, Uncertainty, and Irreversibility , 88 Q . J .  ECON . 3 1 2  ( 1 974) . 
84. See Will iam Thomas et al. , Working Paper on Equity, in COMM ITIEE ON PRINCIPLES 
OF DECISION MAKING FOR REGU LATING CHEMICALS IN  THE ENVIRONMENT, NATIONAL RESEARCH 
COUNCii. ,  NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, DECISION MAKING FOR REGU LATING CHEM ICALS IN 
THE ENVIRONMENT, app. E ( 1 975) .  See also T.  PAGE,  CONSERVATION AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 
1 43-207 ( 1 977). 
85 . J .  KRIER & E. URSI N ,  POLLUTION AND POLICY : A CASE ESSAY ON CALIFORNIA AND 
FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION , 1 940- 1 975 , at 42- 1 32 ( 1 977) . 
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pie , the temporary shutdown of a synthetic rubber plant with highly visible 
fumes was one of the first actions taken.  86 Control measures were adopted in 
response to specific crises and outcries of the public . Because the control 
measures were in response to immediate crises ,  the proposed solutions 
tended to be " immediate" as well . Control policy favored regulatory 
requirements and technological fixes , with existing or quickly developed 
technology (for example , requiring crankcase blow-by devices) over taxes 
and other economic incentives ,  which were perceived as slower and less 
certain . If one solution proved inadequate , there would be a lag , gradual 
realization of the inadequacy , perhaps another crisis , and then another 
incremental , least-cost solution proposed . Thus,  it was only after more than 
twenty years of gradually eliminating more easily contained sources of air 
pollution that automobiles were discovered to be the principal source of Los 
Angeles smog ; the other sources had been controlled , but the smog problem 
remained . 87 
For classical pollution this reactive policy can be viewed as largely 
self-correcting .  It may be rational and workable under the criterion of 
expected cost minimization , as it  guards against active policy mistakes and 
too abrupt and costly change . But for environmental risk the process of 
incremental reaction is not self-correcting . Because of latency,  an effect is 
irreversibly determined before it is clearly observed . And because of the 
diffusion of the effect ,  and its hidden and probabilistic nature , the percep­
tion of crisis may itself be diffused, as has happened in the case of 
carcinogens in drinking water .  Rather than relying upon crisis as the motive 
force in regulatory control , or upon the perception of past failures , adequate 
control of environmental risks requires institutions that anticipate the risks .  
Importantly ,  the same concept of  expected cost minimization suggests that a 
reactive policy can be consistent with some kinds of classical pollution 
while wholly inadequate for environmental risk . Different types of problems 
should be treated differently , even under the same concept of rationality . 
One of the main obstacles to satisfactory management of environmental 
risks is that concepts and institutions which developed in response to 
classical problems have been applied indiscriminately to environmental 
risks . For example, in opposing a ban on freon as a precaution against 
ozone depletion , a spokesman for E . I .  du Pont deNemours & Co . argued : 
"No product should be banned on the basis of a scientific prediction of an 
adverse effect ,  but only on the basis of solid evidence that the damage is 
occurring . " 88 This can be identified as the approach limiting false positives , 
86. Id. at 53-54.
87. For a detailed description of the effort to discover and document the precise contribu­
tion of motor vehicles to Southern California's pollution conditions, see id. at 77- 1 0 1 . 
88. Tannenbaum ,  The Ozone Issue: Fluorocarbon Battle to Heat Up A s  the Regulators 
Move Beyond Aerosols , The Wall St. J . ,  Jan. 19 ,  1 978, at 38, col . 2 .  
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sometimes suitable for classical 
pollut ion , but not for ozone dep
letion , an 
important example of environmen
tal risk . 
Two recent cases illustrate increa
sed judicial recognition of the nee
d to 
respond to environmental risk pr
oblems in a precautionary and an
ticipatory 
manner . In Reserve Mining Co. v. 
EPA ,89 the Court of Appeals for the
 
Eighth Circuit , in reviewing evid
ence on the potential carcinogenic
 effect of 
taconite tailings being discharge
d into Lake Superior , was unabl
e to find 
that the " probability of harm [
was] more l ikely than not . "90 T
he court 
nevertheless recognized that prev
entive judicial action was justifie
d on the 
evidence of potential harm, altho
ugh it modified the lower court ' s  
injunction 
to allow the company a "reaso
nable" time to abate the discha
rges .9 1  In 
Ethyl Corp. v.  EPA92 the Court o
f Appeals for the District of Co
lumbia
upheld EPA '  s regulation of lead
ed gasoline based on the Admin
istrator ' s
determination that lead posed a "
significant risk" t o  public health
,93 reject­
ing arguments that proof of e
ither actual or even probable 
harm was 
necessary . 94 The court agreed w
ith EPA that section 2 1 1  of the
 Clean Air 
Act ,95 which authorized regula
tion of gasoline additives who
se emission
products " will endanger" publi
c health or welfare , was precaut
ionary in 
nature .96 
Similarly , recent federal legisl
ation demonstrates growing co
ngres-
sional awareness of the need for
 a precautionary approach in the
 regulation 
of environmental risks .97 For ex
ample , under the Toxic Substan
ces Control 
Act ,98 the EPA Administrator i
s required to regulate a hazardo
us chemical 
substance or mixture upon a f
inding that it ' 'presents or will
 present an 
unreasonable risk of injury to h
ealth or to the environment . "99 
89 . 5 1 4  F .2d 492 , 7 ERC 1 6
1 8  (8th Cir . 1975) .
90. Id. at 520 ,  7 ERC at 1 636 . 
9 1 .  Id. at 535-40 , 7 ERC at 
J 648-5 1 .
92 .  54 1 F . 2d I , 8 ERC 1 785 (D .C .  
Cir . 1 976) .
93 . Id. at 3 1 -32 , 8 ERC at 1 8
07 . 
94 . Id. at 1 3-20 ,  8 ERC at 1 79
1 -97 . As support for its inter
pretation the court rel ied in pa
rt 
on Reserve Mining , stating th
at " Reserve Mining convinci
ngly demonstrates that the magn
itude 
of risk sufficient to justify 
regulation is inversely propor
tional to the harm to be avoi
ded . "  Id. 
at 1 9 ,  8 ERC at 1 797 . 
95 . 42 U . S .C .  § 1 857f-6c(c)
( l )(A) ( 1 970) (prior to 1 977 a
mendment) . 
96. 541  F .2d at 1 4 , 8 ERC at 
1 795 . The 1 977 Amendments 
to the Clean Air Act amended
§ 
2 1 1  in a manner which re
moves any doubt that the pro
vision authorizes precaution
ary and 
anticipatory regulation .  Sec
tion 2 1  l (c)( l )(A) now allows 
the Administrator to regulat
e fuel
additives upon a determinati
on that the additive "causes , 
or contributes to , air pollution w
hich 
may reasonably be anticipated 
to endanger the public health or 
welfare . . . . " 42 U . S .C . A . 
§ 
7545(c)(l )(A) (West Supp. 
1 978) . 
97 . See generally Doniger , F
ederal Regulation of Vinyl Chloride: 
A Short Course in the 
Law and Policy of Toxic Substance
s Control , 7 EcoLOGY L .Q.  
497 ,  659-64 ( 1 978) .  
98 . 1 5 U . S .C . A . §§  260 1 -262
9 (West Supp. 1 978).  
99 . Id. § 2605 . 
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In summary : 
ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY 
III 
CONCLUSION 
[Vol . 7 : 207 
( I )  Toxic chemicals are one example of the more general class of 
problems labeled environmental risk . 
(2) Environmental risk , though a very general type of problem , has 
nine defining characteristics .  
(3) Environmental risk is not suited to  management primarily on the 
basis of l imiting false positives . Legal and regulatory methods that have 
been developed to manage classical pollution are inadequate for the manage­
ment of environmental risks , because of the differences between the two 
types of problems . 
(4) Limiting false negatives is more suited to environmental risk ' s  
characteristics than limiting false positives . 
(5) A mixed approach , limiting both false positives and false nega­
tives , through an expected value minimization , is more suited to environ­
mental risk problems than either· approach singly . Accommodating legal , 
regulatory , and economic institutions to the criterion of expected value 
minimization is made difficult by the modifications necessitated by risk 
aversion, irreversibility , and intertemporal equity . The criterion of expected 
value , suitably modified , is considerably more conservative than the current 
criterion limiting false positives . 
(6) Incentives need to be restructured for institutions managing en­
vironmental risk so that they are less reactive and more anticipatory and 
precautionary . 
